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This study examines the monitor, a court-appointed officer under the Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act, in order to determine whether and how to best secure its independence. 
Concerns over the role are increasingly over whether it can maintain its supposed impartiality and 
avoid conflicts of interest. This study centers on its fiduciary duty, long discussed in the courts, as 
both problematic because it is not conclusively defined, and as the best means of establishing the 
monitor as a fair and impartial guardian of public confidence in Canadian insolvency law. By 
examining leading insolvency law theories, international and Canadian insolvency policy, and then 
the CCAA and insolvency and fiduciary caselaw, this study proposes codification of the monitor’s 
fiduciary duty. The monitor’s fiduciary duty remains an underexplored concept in the literature, 
and this study proposes clarification and certainty for that duty through its addition to the CCAA. 












SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIENCE 
When large companies find themselves close to being unable to continue paying their 
creditors, they may consider restructuring their business, usually by selling off parts of it, to return 
to financial stability. In Canada, the legislation most used for this is the Companies’ Creditors 
Arrangement Act, 1985 (CCAA). This Act provides the mechanics for a successful restructuring, 
i.e. for a debtor company to reach a compromise with its creditors under a court’s supervision. It 
is required that the court appoint a monitor, an officer that acts as impartial information 
intermediary between all interested parties, advising the debtor company and the court during the 
restructuring. The monitor is supposed to be independent of the parties, in that it is not supposed 
to favour any one party. The role is often referred to as that of an impartial watchdog, ensuring the 
debtor company adheres to what is required of it, and keeping the interested parties and the court 
updated during the proceedings. Yet the role is often placed in situations where it may have a 
previous or ongoing relationship with some of the parties, and may act in a way that is perceived 
as preferring a particular party’s position.  
The present study deals with one aspect of the monitor that has not been satisfactorily 
defined: its fiduciary duty. A fiduciary duty means that one party, the fiduciary, is to act in the best 
interests of the party to whom it owes the duty, with the utmost diligence, good faith, and loyalty. 
Since the monitor was first created by courts, it was held to owe a fiduciary duty to all of the parties 
to the CCAA process. This has never been conclusively determined by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, or by Parliament. This study seeks not only to clarify whether the monitor is a fiduciary, 
but to anchor its status as fiduciary by proposing that its fiduciary duty be added to the CCAA. 
The study argues that inclusion of the monitor’s fiduciary duty in the legislation will protect its 
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 There is no shortage of scholarly debate over the proper purpose of bankruptcy and 
insolvency law.1 This Chapter examines the foundational concepts and theories from which stem 
common understandings of insolvency law. Part I considers major scholarly theories of the 
purposes and functions of bankruptcy and insolvency law. Part II considers how insolvency policy 
guides, written by international bodies, themselves influential upon domestic legislation, reflect 
such theories. Part III considers the relevance of these theories to proceedings under Canada’s 
main corporate restructuring statute: the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).2  Part 
IV provides a concluding summary and introduces the next Chapter. 
 The Supreme Court of Canada has summarized the purpose of the CCAA as being: “to 
permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and 
economic costs of liquidating its assets.”3 A decade later, the Court expanded on this statement, 
holding that the CCAA’s objectives are  simultaneously to maximize creditor recovery, protect the 
going-concern value of the debtor company, safeguard as best as possible the socioeconomic 
interests of employees and affected communities, and act as a bulwark of the credit system.4 An 
examination of insolvency theory is helpful to understanding not only Canadian restructuring 
practice, but also the CCAA’s stated policy goals. The CCAA pursues its objectives by, among 
other things, imbuing judges with broad discretionary powers, to be exercised in their supervisory 
 
1 The terms ‘bankruptcy and insolvency law’, ‘bankruptcy law’, and ‘insolvency law’ will be used interchangeably, 
to refer to the body of law that deals with companies who are or will soon be unable to pay debts as they become due. 
See e.g., Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, “Bankruptcy and Insolvency at a Glance” (2 December 
2015), online:<www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/h_br01545.html>. 
2 RSC 1985, c C-36. 
3 Century Services v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at para 15 [Century Services]. 
4 9354-9186 Québec inc v Callidus Capital Corp, 2020 SCC 10 at para 42 [Callidus], citing Janis Sarra. Rescue!: The 





role in CCAA cases.5 In this unique supervisory capacity,6 CCAA judges are assisted by the court-
appointed monitor.7  The role of the monitor, a court-appointed officer that serves as information 
intermediary, tasked with keeping creditors apprised of the financial condition of the debtor,8 is 
crucial to the court’s analysis of the parties’ restructuring proposals.9 Importantly, the monitor 
owes a fiduciary duty to all parties– it is obligated to act in the best interest of all parties to the 
proceedings.10 It is in order to determine whether and to what extent the monitor’s duty conflicts 
with the practice of insolvency law under the CCAA that this Chapter returns to first principles, 
(that is, insolvency theory and policy). The monitor’s role can only be properly examined with a 
clear understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of its governing legislation.  
 My proposal is that the monitor’s fiduciary duty, as understood in the jurisprudence, be 
codified in the CCAA as a fiduciary duty to the process, ensuring the fairness of the process in the 
pursuit of the CCAA’s objectives. The function of this Chapter in the overall thesis is to identify 
the core principles and theories underlying insolvency law. From this foundation, Chapter Two 
will then narrow the focus onto the monitor, its duties, and its role within the CCAA regime. 
Chapter Three examines fiduciary law in Canada and the monitor’ status as a fiduciary, drawing 
comparisons between the monitor and other fiduciaries in Canadian corporate and insolvency law. 
It concludes with my proposal for codification of the monitor’s twofold fiduciary duty, namely, to 
act in the best interests of the collective of stakeholders in the restructuring and to ensure that the 
 
5 Callidus, ibid at paras 47, 48, citing Century Services, supra note 3 at para 58. 
6 Callidus, ibid at para 47. 
7 Ibid at para 52. 
8 See e.g., Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) at 26 
[Sarra, “Creditor Rights”]; Richard H McLaren, Canadian Commercial Reorganization: Preventing Bankruptcy, 
(Aurora, Ont: Canada Law Book, 1994) ch 1 at para 1.2900; Roderick J Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law, 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) at 317 [Wood, “Bankruptcy”]. 
9 Callidus, supra note 4 at para 52. 
10 Wood, “Bankruptcy”, ibid; Winalta Inc (Re), 2011 ABQB 399 [Winalta] at para 67 (“[a] monitor owes a fiduciary 
duty to the stakeholders; is required to account to the court; is to act independently; and must treat all parties reasonably 





process is fair. Chapter Four concludes the thesis by providing the proposed language for codifying 
this fiduciary duty and addressing objections to my proposal.  
The practice of insolvency law seems, at times, to be at odds with insolvency theory. The 
key takeaway of Chapter One is that theory and policy only tell part of the story. In order to fully 
grasp the mechanics of the CCAA, this Chapter undertakes an historical analysis of the CCAA. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Century Services recognized that “incremental exercise of 
judicial discretion” has been the driving force in the evolution of the CCAA.”11  Further analysis 
reveals that secured creditors have provided much of the impetus for the inception and evolution 
of the CCAA, on an ad hoc basis through the courts. Understood in this way, the numerous 
insolvency theories reflected in the policy guides, and throughout the CCAA, are revealed often 
to reflect secured creditors’ interests. Where the CCAA seems to favour other parties, these 
concessions operate to assuage the overt influence that secured creditors have over the legislative 
and judicial process of CCAA lawmaking. However, CCAA courts are most concerned with 
fairness, and therein lies the balance to be struck between powerful players—such as secured 
creditors—and other stakeholders in the process.12 Accordingly, to the extent that secured creditors 
are so favoured, we should expect to see at least some disconnect between the CCAA’s (judicially) 
stated objectives and the monitor’s role in carrying out its duties in practice. 
 
 
11 Supra note 3 at para 58; See also Dylex Ltd (Re) (1995), 31 CBR (3d) 106 (Ont Ct (Gen Div)) (“[t]he history of 
CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation” Dylex, ibid at para 10). 
12 Callidus, ibid at para 51 (“[t]he procedures set out in the CCAA rely on negotiations and compromise between the 
debtor and its stakeholders, as overseen by the supervising judge and the monitor… [which] requires that, to the extent 






PART I – INSOLVENCY THEORY 
 Bankruptcy and insolvency law is unique not for its ability to readjust the entitlements born 
of other areas of the law, but because it can extinguish such entitlements entirely.13 It is because 
of this feature of insolvency law that scholars have long debated what the purpose and function of 
insolvency law ought to be. One prominent author clarifies that: 
[i]n common law jurisdictions, it is now well established that bankruptcy law serves three 
principal functions: (1) to solve the “collective action problem” discouraging creditors 
from collaborating outside of bankruptcy and to provide a mechanism in bankruptcy 
legislation for the orderly liquidation of a bankrupt’s estate and distribution of the proceeds 
among the creditors; (2) to enable basically viable enterprises to reorganize themselves to 
allow them to stay in business; and (3) to enable overextended debtors to make a “fresh 
start” by surrendering their non-exempt assets and obtaining a discharge for the balance of 
their debts.14 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is still some tension regarding the importance to be afforded 
to each of these functions. Accordingly, this Part will first examine scholarly debate regarding the 
theoretical underpinnings of bankruptcy and insolvency law. 
(i) Creditors’ Bargain Theory (CBT) 
 Most modern debates over the purposes of bankruptcy and insolvency law can be traced to 
the CBT, formulated by Thomas Jackson in the 1980s.15 CBT sees “bankruptcy as a system 
designed to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were 
they able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante position.”16 The goal is to overcome the 
“collective action problem,” that arises where creditors act on a narrowly self-interested basis, 
individually seeking to collect on their claims.17 Without a mechanism for coordinating their 
 
13 See e.g., Elizabeth Warren, “Bankruptcy Policy” (1987) 54:3 U Chicago L Rev 775 at 784–85 [Warren, 
“Bankruptcy”].  
14 Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Thomas G W Telfer, eds, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law in Canada: Cases, Materials, and 
Problems (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2019) at 22.   
15 Thomas H Jackson, “Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain” (1982) 91:5 Yale LJ 
857. 
16 Ibid at 861. 





collection efforts, the creditors are trapped in a collective action problem, each individually racing 
to collect from their mutual debtor before the other creditors can do likewise.18 This race destroys 
the going concern value of the debtor’s business, depleting the pool of assets available to the 
creditors as a group. CBT sets out how bankruptcy law solves this problem. Jackson’s account 
begins with a recognition of pre-existing, nonbankruptcy entitlements.19 Jackson rejects a view of 
bankruptcy that is aimed solely at “relieving an overburdened debtor from ‘oppressive’ debt.”20 
Instead, Jackson sees bankruptcy as “[a] collective system that treats all claimants standing in the 
same relationship to the debtor alike… [and that provides] a sum “certain” for the uncertain amount 
that might be realized under an individualistic creditors' remedy system.”21 In other words, Jackson 
argues that bankruptcy law should be geared towards lowering the creditors’ collection costs,22 
thereby maximizing the value of the pool of assets available to them.23  
Importantly, CBT is supposed to effect “a net benefit: the secured creditor would be no 
worse off than before and the unsecured creditors could be made better off.”24 This focus on 
efficiency for all parties works because by respecting nonbankruptcy entitlements—especially 
those of secured creditors—the cost of collection is lowered, and unsecured creditors benefit 
without having a detrimental effect on secured creditor claims.25 Jackson’s reasoning here is that 
secured creditors “would have no reason to object to such an inclusion if left as well off as 
 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid at 858. 
20 Ibid at 857. 
21 Ibid at 861 [footnotes omitted].  
22 Ibid at 869. 
23 Ibid at 865 (“the total pool of assets available to satisfy their claims may be increased through collective action… 
[so] one would expect them to agree to a collective system that deterred the sub-optimal behavior of the prisoner's 
dilemma, and… to capture and share the "going concern" value of D's business” ibid). 
24 Ibid at 870. 
25 Ibid at 869–70 (secured creditors’ collection costs, when acting unilaterally, are passed on to the debtor, which 
“would increase the secured creditor's claim… [and] pro tanto, reduce the pool of assets available for the unsecured 





before.”26 Moreover the cost of the—secured and unsecured—creditors’ positions in a pre-
bankruptcy scenario are already factored in, given that secured creditors accept reduced interest 
payments in exchange for an increased chance of repayment, while unsecured creditors receive the 
reverse.27 
Suspicious of attempts to circumvent nonbankruptcy entitlements, Jackson argues that the 
bankruptcy process is best reserved for complex situations that are unlikely to be resolved 
informally, that is, by private negotiation among the debtor and its creditors.28 Such situations 
typically arise when there are large numbers of creditors. 29 Corporate debtors will typically have 
a constantly changing and growing group of creditors, 30 which is difficult to track and increases 
the cost of negotiations while decreasing the likelihood of a consensual agreement.31 Nonetheless, 
Jackson’s emphasis on preserving nonbankruptcy entitlements is the foundation of CBT: 
[t]he presence of a bankruptcy system does not mandate its use. The realization that a 
creditor could always initiate the bankruptcy process would deter attempts in any 
nonbankruptcy collective proceeding to provide any creditor with less than the minimum 
obtainable in a bankruptcy proceeding. The availability of a mandatory collective system 
in which distributions are governed by a set of statutory rules is, therefore, important 
because it stipulates a minimum set of entitlements for claimants that, in turn, provides a 
framework for implementing a consensual collective proceeding outside of the bankruptcy 
process.32 
 
26 Ibid at 870 [emphasis in original]. 
27 Ibid at 871 (“a secured creditor has already "paid" for this prior entitlement- really a higher probability of being 
repaid-through receipt of a lower return… [while] unsecured creditors have already been "paid" for allowing this prior 
entitlement and they receive a higher rate of return because of their lower priority [footnotes omitted]” ibid). 
28 Ibid at 860 (this would seem to suggest that in situations of financial distress absent the difficulties that precipitate 
the collective action problem, Jackson would proceed with informal resolution; see above discussion cited to note 25 
for Jackson’s detailed explanation). 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid at 866–67. 
31 Ibid (“the creditors themselves cannot be expected to negotiate this agreement, even though it would be in their 
joint interest to do so… [so this is where a] federal bankruptcy rule [steps in to provide a] mandatory collective system 
after insolvency has occurred” ibid).  





In Jackson’s view, the justification for the formal bankruptcy regime is that it maximizes the value 
of the assets available to the creditors.33 Bankruptcy, therefore, is a mechanism for vindicating the 
individual self-interest of creditors, which is done by resolving the collective action problem by 
which individual action would destroy value for the group. This is most evident from Jackson’s 
consideration of the distinction between reorganization (i.e., restructuring)34 and liquidation. He 
notes that so long as the principal objective or result is one where the pool of debtor assets is 
augmented, it does not matter whether bankruptcy leads to restructuring or liquidation.35 As will 
be discussed in the later section on the CCAA, the question of whether to restructure or liquidate 
a debtor can be controversial. For Jackson, these concepts are one and the same, in that 
“reorganization, at least as a start, may be viewed as a form of liquidation… [where the debtor 
business is] sold to the creditors themselves rather than to third parties.”36 Both avenues serve the 
same purpose vis-à-vis generating returns for the creditors.37 In short, creditors will prefer a 
reorganization where they expect it to generate greater returns for them than a liquidation—in such 
cases, in effect, the existing creditors are buying their debtor’s business rather than selling it to a 
third party buyer because it is worth more to them than to any third party. Jackson’s only caveat is 
that liquidation lends itself more easily to direct satisfaction of nonbankruptcy entitlements/claims, 
whereas reorganization produces difficult valuation of the same payments.38 Jackson’s view is that 
 
33 It would be a stretch to say this is the sole purpose, as insolvency law also serves to resolve the collective action 
problem, which is also a principal function. 
34 The terms reorganization and restructuring will be used interchangeably throughout and are terms of art in Canadian 
law which are not defined in any statute.  
35 Jackson, supra note 15 at 864. 
36 Ibid at 893 [footnotes omitted]. 
37 Ibid at 895 (“[w]hether the process be a piecemeal liquidation, a going concern liquidation (i.e., a sale of the entity 
to a third party), or a reorganization liquidation (i.e., a sale of the entity to the creditors), nothing in the form of the 
process seems to call for a different standard of allocation among claims (the second step) in one type of proceeding 
than in another” ibid). 
38 Ibid at 894 (“[i]n a reorganization, however, the proceeds from the "sale" out of which claims against the debtor 
will be paid will consist principally of new claims against the same enterprise… [making] the valuation of the payment 





insolvency law’s compulsory, collective process resolves the collective action problem by 
imposing a stay on individual creditor actions. This makes it possible for the creditors to 
collectively pursue a value-maximizing outcome. Ultimately, Jackson’s commitment to upholding 
pre-existing, nonbankruptcy entitlements produces a theory that views insolvency law as a helpful 
supplement to an established body of nonbankruptcy law, and whose main function is creditor 
wealth maximization.  
(ii) Loss Distribution Theory (LDT) 
 Jackson’s CBT focuses on addressing the policy goal of maximizing creditor recovery, 
which Elizabeth Warren views as a major shortcoming because it is too narrow of a policy goal.39 
For Warren, insolvency law is “an attempt to reckon with a debtor's multiple defaults and to 
distribute the consequences among a number of different actors.”40 Warren sees distribution 
concerns as fundamental to insolvency law. Her approach, LDT, considers that there are multiple 
policy concerns and values, none of which reigns supreme, which are reflected in the way that 
insolvency law distributes the losses flowing from the debtor’s insolvency among its different 
stakeholders.41 Put another way, LDT departs from CBT’s narrow search for maximizing value, 
into a wider search for an optimal compromise between competing claims against a limited pool 
of assets.42 The policy of ensuring fairness and protecting the vulnerable is taken in LDT to be a 
necessary goal of insolvency law, evidenced by consistent comments from legislators and courts 
about safeguarding the average investor and offering protection for employees and businesses 
 
39 Warren, “Bankruptcy”, supra note 13 (“the policies endorsed to support bankruptcy pronouncements are… asserted 
only obliquely, and they are rarely challenged directly” ibid at 776). 
40 Ibid at 777. 
41 Ibid; The term ‘stakeholder’ will be used to refer to all interested parties in a bankruptcy, whether creditor or non-
creditor. 
42 “[d]iscussing the debtor-creditor system is much like focusing a camera… depending on where the focus is directed, 





alike.43 For Warren, “[t]hese comments serve as reminders that Congress intended bankruptcy law 
to address concerns broader than the immediate problems of debtors and their identified 
creditors.”44 
 Like Jackson, Warren is cognizant of the self-interested, survival mindset of the actors in 
insolvency law.45 That is, she also recognizes that bankruptcy is very much “creditor-versus-
creditor, with competing creditors struggling to push the losses of default onto others.”46 Contrary 
to Jackson, Warren’s LDT focuses on distribution—both of losses and payments—as its central 
tenet, surpassing value maximization and the primacy of pre-existing entitlements.47 As for the 
former, by its very nature the distribution of losses is an attempt to compromise claims in a way 
that looks beyond maximizing value, and towards spreading the consequences that led to default 
with a view to preserving the business.48 This view necessarily favours reorganization to 
liquidation; it seeks to end up with the debtor emerging from the process with a viable ongoing 
business. On the latter point of the primacy of nonbankruptcy entitlements, Warren is highly 
critical of any hard and fast predetermination of winners and losers that unreasonably leaves the 
most vulnerable49 stakeholders to bear the brunt of the losses.50 What this means is that creditors, 
along with a broader community of stakeholders, will have to “defer some collection rights… in 
order to give the debtor an opportunity to continue as a viable business.”51 
 
43 Ibid at 788 (Warren’s discussion solely encompasses the American system, however her points find direct parallels 
in Canada, as will be explored in the later section on the CCAA). 
44 Ibid.  
45 I.e. for every actor that gains, one or more actors have to suffer a loss, leading to a zero-sum game.  
46 Warren, “Bankruptcy”, supra note 13 at 785. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid at 787–88. 
49 See ibid at 786–88, 793 (Warren gives examples of several vulnerable groups: future tort claimants, customers, 
suppliers, employees, etc.). 
50 Ibid (“Congress… accepted the idea that bankruptcy serves to protect interests that have no other protection… [such 
as t]he older employee, the regular customer, the dependent supplier, and the local community… regardless of whether 
they have rights recognized at state law” ibid at 788). 





 LDT’s focus on distribution centres around the individual self-interested creditor, given 
that even in the absence of insolvency law, creditors will seek to collect.52 This inherent quality of 
bankruptcy and insolvency necessitates, for Warren, the policy considerations underscored in 
LDT. The fact that stakeholders are faced “with an inadequate pie to divide and the looming 
discharge of unpaid debts,”53 means that care must be taken during the fight over slices of the pie 
to not overlook: 
inquiries into many issues, including who may be hurt by a business failure, how they may 
be hurt, whether the hurt can be avoided, at what cost it can be avoided, who is helped by 
the business failure, whether aid to those helped offsets the injury to those hurt, who can 
efficiently evaluate the risks of business failure, who may have contributed to the business 
failure, how they may have contributed, whether the contribution to failure serves other 
useful goals, who can best bear the costs of business failure, and who expected to bear the 
costs of business failure-just to name a few.54 
Warren’s conception thus leans towards public interest and away from the more law and 
economics approach preferred by CBT theorists. Warren’s camp worries over not leaving any 
hungry mouths now, whilst Jackson’s approach slices the pie based on previously placed orders of 
pie slices. In more technical terms, LDT seeks to set out an effective scheme, alleviating the 
negative consequences of distributional choices on certain vulnerable groups. 
(iii) Baird’s Reply to Warren: Resuscitating the CBT 
 Jackson and Warren represent opposing sides of insolvency law theory. The third voice in 
this debate, Douglas Baird,55 attempts to restate CBT in response to Warren’s criticisms. Baird’s 
conception of insolvency law is that it: “is a procedure in which the actions of those with rights to 
the assets of a firm are stayed and the affairs of the firm are sorted out in an orderly way.”56 Baird, 
 
52 Ibid at 790 (“[e]ven if there were no legal scheme to distribute the costs of default, the losses would be distributed… 
[whether] by creditor speed (who first backs up to the warehouse with big trucks) or strength (who can carry away the 
most while others look on) or by debtor favoritism (who gets the first call when the debtor decides to give up” ibid.) 
53 Ibid at 785. 
54 Ibid at 796. 
55 “Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren” (1987) 54:3 U Chicago L Rev 815. 





like Jackson, stresses that insolvency law provides an alternative debt-collection process, running 
parallel to existing nonbankruptcy entitlements, in a situation involving multiple actors’ rights.57 
The main difference between Warren’s approach and that of Jackson and Baird is that the latter 
pair believe the distribution of losses is a question addressed outside of bankruptcy law, while the 
former believes this is the core issue in insolvency law.58  
This is well-illustrated in Baird’s consideration of secured creditor rights and noncreditor 
rights.  For secured creditors, “[t]he idea is not to give them a good deal, but rather to approximate 
the same deal that they had outside of bankruptcy so that no one has an incentive to begin a 
bankruptcy proceeding simply because its distributional rule is different.”59 Accordingly, if 
changes need to be made to the nonbankruptcy rights of secured creditors, that is precisely where 
they should be made: in nonbankruptcy law.60 As for noncreditors—and this reasoning applies to 
the wider array of stakeholders envisioned by Warren—Baird states that “[o]ne cannot say that 
bankruptcy is necessary to protect those without legally cognizable interests without first 
answering the question of why these individuals cannot be given such interests.”61 In other words, 
insolvency law does not operate to create rights but to procedurally employ existing nonbankruptcy 
rights.62 Baird’s reasoning is that if a stakeholder group is granted rights in bankruptcy that it 
would not otherwise have, this creates a perverse incentive for such a group to pursue bankruptcy, 
 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid at 815–16 (“[t]he issue, it must be noted, is not how losses from a firm failure should be distributed, but whether 
this question (however hard it may be to answer) is a question of the law generally (as Jackson and I would argue) or 
one peculiar to bankruptcy law (as Warren would argue)” ibid at 816). 
59 Ibid at 832. 
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61 Ibid at 828. 
62 Ibid at 827 (“existing bankruptcy law does not set substantive rights and its procedural rights can be understood 





and for opposing parties to avoid same, resulting in forum shopping.63 Warren’s suggestion that 
such parties be protected is thus a question that, for Baird, should be addressed outside of 
insolvency law, lest there be disparity between the two forums of debt-collection that results in 
increased costs.64 Baird summarizes this as follows: 
Warren thinks that the benefits of bankruptcy justify additional burdens on creditors. But 
the issue is not whether the burdens on creditors in bankruptcy are just, but whether the 
burdens should exist only in bankruptcy. Creditors enjoy the benefits of the nonbankruptcy 
debt collection system as well. Why should they not have to take the rights of workers into 
account when they use that system? More to the point, taxing creditors differently 
depending on which enforcement mechanism they use invites troublesome forum 
shopping.65 
 CBT’s view is that while the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy debt collection mechanisms 
operate as an alternative to each other, this does not impose more or less importance on either 
method.66 Baird also clarifies that CBT’s emphasis on pre-existing nonbankruptcy entitlements 
does not “assume that whatever priorities are created under nonbankruptcy law are right.”67 CBT’s 
acceptance of the parallel nature of these systems rests on their ability to resolve the collective 
action problem.68 Importantly, the option of insolvency law does not imply a “reason for 
reassessing relative entitlements.”69 This brings the argument back full circle to the question of 
rights, which Baird reasserts is one that is best answered by upholding nonbankruptcy entitlements, 
and not of manufacturing fresh rights from insolvency law.70 Take the example of the rights of 
 
63 Ibid at 817–18 (“it will not do to advocate giving workers a special priority in bankruptcy but not elsewhere… 
[because if] workers enjoy a special priority only in bankruptcy, creditors will strive to resolve their differences outside 
of bankruptcy” ibid).  
64 Ibid at 824. 
65 Ibid at 818. 
66 Ibid at 827 (“[i]f these nonbankruptcy priorities bring no benefits of their own and if they bring normatively 
undesirable distributional consequences when the debtor's assets are insufficient, it would seem better to eliminate 
these priorities entirely, rather than merely create a separate enforcement mechanism that sometimes can be used to 
ignore them” ibid at 825). 
67 Ibid (in fact, Baird recognizes that “[t]hey frequently are not” ibid).  
68 Ibid.  
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secured creditors, consistently referenced because they are the party with the strongest position in 
debt collection proceedings. Such creditors have a predetermined priority right, which allows them 
“a place in line; and having a place in line matters largely because some people may be shut out.”71  
This is the very thing that LDT seeks to avoid, by its focus on a fair and reasonable 
distribution of losses.72 That is, as we observed in the previous section, Warren’s conception of 
insolvency law is premised on a policy of encouraging the continuance of a debtor’s business.73 
Baird takes issue with this, noting that not only does CBT purposefully avoid the question of which 
parties should endure losses,74 but it also respects that “ownership of the firm is a question quite 
distinct from its survival.”75 This harkens back to recognition of creditors’ self-interest and 
autonomy, but reformulates it to state that if the collective interest of creditors, as a “united front” 
is to shutter the business, then it is their prerogative to do so, whether inside of insolvency law or 
not.76 Moreover, the ownership interests, most of which are stayed in insolvency law, do not bear 
on how the assets to which those rights are attached are used, or whether the business as a whole 
continues to operate.77 Put simply, LDT’s understanding of insolvency law as inherently seeking 
to keep a debtor’s business going in spite of the wishes of a majority of creditors eschews law for 
policy preference, and does nothing to justify the use of insolvency law to achieve such an end.78 
Baird is clear that default does not imply a bankruptcy scenario, anymore than it implies a business 
 
71 Ibid at 823. 
72 Note that Warren does not clearly define what she means by fairness; See e.g., Elizabeth Warren, “Bankruptcy 
Policymaking in an Imperfect World” (1993) 92:2 Mich L Rev 336 (here she vaguely refers to ‘fairness arguments’ 
as stating “that bankruptcy is a forum in which everyone parts with some rights in order to participate in a process that 
works for the collective good” ibid at 361) [Warren, “Policymaking”]. 
73 Baird, supra note 55 at 828. 
74 Ibid at 823 (Baird also reminds us that CBT theorists “do not conceive this as a bankruptcy question” ibid). 
75 Ibid at 833. 
76 Ibid at 830. 
77 Ibid at 820 (“[t]o assert, as Warren does, that a creditor may need to sacrifice some of its ownership interest so that 
the firm might survive takes issue with most of what has been written about corporate finance over the last three 
decades” ibid). 





has failed.79 Shifting resources to ensure claims are upheld will always benefit some to the 
detriment of others.80 What is crucial, is to understand that the above is the justification for the two 
possible paths to debt collection: “it is because default does not always raise a collective problem 
that there are two avenues… [wherein] bankruptcy's avenue of enforcement springs from the 
collective action problem.”81 
This again leads to the premise of the separation of insolvency law and nonbankruptcy 
issues upon which rests the foundation for CBT. In an attempt to ascribe to insolvency law that 
which is not unique to or even a component of it, e.g., loss distribution,82 noncreditor protection,83 
etc., “one simply talks about social policy generally.”84 This is not to say that CBT is cold and 
heartless. Baird is careful to assert that vulnerable parties, such as retiring employees, are not 
afforded adequate rights, and that this merits changes in existing nonbankruptcy laws dealing with 
such topics.85 His point—and Jackson’s—as has been shown throughout, is merely that this 
problem should not find its solution in insolvency law.86 It should find its solution in legislating 
outside of insolvency law to address such apparent shortcomings.  
(iv)  Reshaping CBT: The Authentic Consent Model (ACM) 
Rizwaan Mokal offers what can be considered an alternate version of CBT: the ACM.87 
He contends that CBT contains an essential flaw that undermines its stated goal. Specifically, CBT 
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82 Ibid at 822 (“[n]onbankruptcy priority rules distribute losses and will continue to do so regardless of whether a 
special set of bankruptcy priority rules exists” ibid). 
83 Ibid at 830 (“Warren is wrong to think that existing bankruptcy law cares about the rights of noncreditors… [given 
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claims” ibid). 
84 Ibid at 831. 
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states that when creditors negotiate their hypothetical bargain ex ante, that is, prior to the debtor’s 
bankruptcy, they do so from behind a veil of ignorance.  That is, the creditors do not know what 
relative position they will occupy—what their relative strengths and weaknesses will be—if their 
debtor becomes bankrupt.  Consequently, the creditors can negotiate for a set of bankruptcy 
procedures that all of them would agree are fair: “since creditors do not know how well-placed 
they would be to race for the debtor's assets, they cannot bias the selection process so as to produce 
principles favouring them at the expense of others.”88 Mokal, however, points out that creditors in 
the real world are surely aware of their strength/leverage relative to other creditors, even if they 
cannot predict the outcomes of any particular transaction.89 Creditors with such knowledge would 
thus not agree with each other ex ante, and would likely also renege on any such deal, changing 
positions in subsequent transactions,  as their circumstances change relative to other parties.90 The 
result is that strong creditors have no reason to concede their position and would insist on having 
priority within the hierarchical ranking of creditors in bankruptcy.91 Mokal considers that Jackson 
may have conceived of the collective proceeding as still being worthwhile for stronger creditors 
because it addresses the fact that the race to collect increases costs for all creditors, and provides 
them with a “relative certainty of ranking pari passu.”92 However, Mokal considers these 
insufficient defences for CBT, in that they still fall short of incorporating the varying strengths of 
different creditors, and their respective knowledge thereof.93 Mokal’s position essentially “points 
 
88 Ibid at 410. 
89 Ibid at 411 (“[t]hey might not know how a particular transaction is going to turn out, but they are aware of whether 
they are systematically faster than their competitors, or of whether they wield special influence over the debtor, etc.” 
ibid). 
90 Ibid at 412 (“[t]his ensures either that no agreement would be reached, or if reached, would be exploitative and 
oppressive of weaker parties” ibid at 440). 
91 Ibid at 412.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid (“[t]hese arguments should reinforce the conclusion reached above, that different creditors would make 
different demands at the ex ante stage, and only some types of creditor would find the automatic stay to be in their 





up the fact that Jackson's model merely reflects, and does not correct for, the relative inequalities 
of the creditors at an arbitrary point in time.”94 
 The answer to this problem is to “deprive the creditors of the Creditors’ Bargain of any 
knowledge of who they are.”95 Basically, Mokal suggests that the uncertainty of how a creditor’s 
position may change once its debtor becomes insolvent necessitates a consideration of all possible 
interests which they may turn out to hold.96 While creditors are aware of their current capabilities 
relative to other parties, they cannot confidently discern whether their position will be better if 
they move unilaterally, or collectively.97 For this reason, they would necessarily consider the 
implications of participating in the collective regime.98 Moreover, “the type of creditor who could 
do better without a stay is precisely the sort best able to cope with the effects of the stay if it is 
imposed.”99 ACM recognizes that the strongest players can calculate the effects of insolvency into 
their initial lending, thus making them able to subsume any negative effects of collective 
proceedings.100 This means that a creditor, regardless of strength, may agree to a smaller asset pool 
through the collective regime, if such regime eliminates the possibility that they will turn out to be 
on the losing side of debt collection.101  
 
94 Alfonso Nocilla, “Asset Sales and Secured Creditor Control in Restructuring: A Comparison of the UK, US and 
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therefore the hypothetical creditors in Jackson’s model are not behind a true veil of ignorance). 
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96 Ibid at 437. 
97 Ibid at 438. 
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99 Ibid at 439. 
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 Importantly, like CBT, Mokal also stipulates that “[s]imply because an issue can “arise in 
insolvency” does not by itself mean it should be dealt with by insolvency law.”102 However, he 
notes that ACM takes a broader view than CBT, insofar as it does not limit “participation in the ex 
ante agreement to those who have contracted for legal rights to the debtor’s assets once insolvency 
has occurred.”103 He does not significantly expand on these comments, noting only that a direct 
financial interest should not be the only prerequisite for consideration under insolvency law.104 
The ACM is also criticized for reaching the same policy position as CBT, or otherwise of 
suggesting a result which can be reached by using CBT.105 For example, ACM focuses on 
reciprocity over self-interest, however Mokal seems to “blur the distinction… [where,] [a]t the 
level of application, reciprocity starts to look very like a proxy for long-term self interest relative 
to short-term self-interest.”106 Mokal’s response to this criticism is to highlight the difference 
between CBT’s contractarian nature and ACM’s contractualist approach, whereby “the ACM is 
a ‘justice as reciprocity’ rather than a ‘justice as mutual advantage’ theory.”107 ACM’s 
contractualist approach “designs its ‘choice position’,”108 and thus once in the choice position, 
“parties are assumed to be motivated by rational self-interest alone.”109 In the choice position, the 
parties may strategize out of self-interest, but reciprocity is already assured by their necessary 
accounting for the possibility that they might turn out to hold some unfortunate position.110 
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(v) Conclusions Regarding CBT and LDT 
 From the above theoretical debate, we can draw the following conclusions regarding the 
purposes of insolvency law. First, insolvency law may be thought of as a means of solving the 
collective action problem that arises when creditors race to enforce their claims individually and 
thereby destroy the value of a common pool of assets.  Insolvency law solves this problem by 
imposing a collective resolution process on all creditors. This is the key purpose of insolvency law 
according to CBT. This theory further contends that the sole purpose of insolvency law should be 
to maximize the value of the assets available to the bankrupt’s creditors, leaving other concerns, 
e.g., broader socioeconomic considerations, for legislatures to address. So long as insolvency law 
respects nonbankruptcy entitlement—reflecting the hypothetical bargain that creditors would have 
struck ex ante acting in their individual self-interest—then insolvency is not an intrusion into the 
private, contractual rights of creditors. ACM departs from CBT here,111 stating that it is necessary 
that creditors anticipate that they could turn out to be in a winning or losing position in insolvency, 
and for that reason, agree to the collective proceeding. Importantly, the CBT approach does not 
concern itself with the effects or consequences that stem from bankruptcy (i.e. socioeconomic 
implications). It merely situates itself in the pre-bankruptcy past, discerns economic rights, then 
travels to the bankruptcy present, and distributes claims so as to best respect said prior entitlements.  
 On the other hand, insolvency law may be thought of as a means of dealing with losses. It 
directs itself to the most reasonable distribution possible of the consequences of the debtor’s 
inability to pay. This is the LDT side of the coin. From this perspective, insolvency law should not 
be so narrowly confined to money value and profit. Rather, insolvency law can properly direct 
itself to maximizing value, only if in doing so it also accounts for the vulnerability of a broader 
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array of stakeholders, impacted by the debtor’s bankruptcy. Accordingly, insolvency law can be 
best defined as a means of redistributing losses so that no one group, or groups is unfairly 
overburdened. 
 A few criticisms are worth mentioning. Not all firms that fail actually enter bankruptcy 
proceedings112 (and vice versa),113 which raises the question: why should insolvency law seek to 
ascribe priority rights to vulnerable groups in one situation but not in the other?114 This casts doubt 
on the scope of the vulnerability analysis of LDT, though it does not dispel the notion that such an 
analysis could be important. On another note, CBT is premised on an ex ante—i.e., forecasting a 
potential—scenario where creditors are either all ‘alike’,115 or at least ignorant of what their 
creditor status will be in a bankruptcy scenario. This means the fairness of the insolvency law 
system, under CBT, hinges on equality between the parties, which is at best an extremely unlikely 
set of circumstances, as pointed out by the ACM. Therefore, if creditors are not on equal footing, 
their self-interest will be to protect the degree to which they are exposed to risk, further polarizing 
strong and weak creditors. In a negotiation among creditors of unequal leverage, one would expect 
those with the most leverage to wield it to obtain the most favourable terms.  
One takeaway from the foregoing debates is that insolvency law is primarily focused on 
economic rights.   Arguably, this supports the view of the CBT that the primary goal of insolvency 
 
112 It should be further noted that in U.S. Chapter 11, a debtor need not be insolvent in order to file for protection and 
reorganize itself; See Bankruptcy Code, USC title 1, §109(d) [Code]. 
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law should be creditor wealth maximization. Nonetheless, to focus solely thereon is perhaps too 
narrow of a construction, and so an analysis of vulnerability should follow. Ultimately then, the 
question is whether insolvency law should include a more thorough consideration of vulnerable 
parties, or whether the proper solution is for legislatures to address these concerns outside of 
insolvency law. In short, value maximization as a singular focus is too narrow, and too large a 
focus on distribution of losses—for example on redistribution—is anathema to the effective 
satisfaction of claims stemming from fairly obtained economic rights.116 What is perhaps most 
important, is that insolvency law provide a forum where strong and weak players alike are able to 
voice their opinions,117 and which fairly reflects their strengths and weaknesses.118 
 As may be evident from the foregoing, the principal tension is over how wide of a net to 
cast when determining the alleviatory effects insolvency law should have on stakeholders of a 
debtor. This is still an ongoing discussion, which, as will be seen below, continues to polarize 
theorists.  
(vi) Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization (TPT) 
 One counter to CBT is the TPT, by Lynn LoPucki.119 This theory is greatly influenced by 
Warren’s LDT, in that it recognizes and seeks to address the interests of the broader groups making 
up creditor and noncreditor stakeholders of the debtor, with the goal of keeping the business 
operating.120 Whereas CBT is premised on a hypothetical agreement between creditors from an ex 
 
116 See e.g., Mokal, “Contractarianism”, supra note 107 at 90 (Mokal says that CBT rejects the notion that insolvency 
law is redistributive, and sees it as “redistributive in the relevant sense if and to the extent to which it alters the relative 
values of the pre-insolvency rights held by the various parties, most obviously, by vesting new rights in some which 
they do not have under the general law” ibid). 
117 See e.g., Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, “On Fairness and Efficiency” (2003) 66:3 Mod L Rev 452 at 452 [Mokal, 
“Fairness”]. 
118 Ibid at 465 (Mokal provides an example: “[i]n the famous Creditors' Bargain model, for example, the unsecured 
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consent is sought and fairness thus established” ibid). 
119 “A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization” (2004) 57:3 Vand L Rev 741. 
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ante position, TPT centres “on the actual contracts entered into by team members,”121 which are 
defined as “all who make firm-specific investments but are unable to protect those investments by 
direct contracting, personal trust, or reputation.”122 TPT depends on directors, who are afforded 
primacy,123 insofar as they are the ultimate decisionmakers “over both the direction of the 
enterprise and the distribution among team members of production rents and surpluses.”124 Put 
simply, TPT recognizes the interdependency between the parties that make up a debtor’s 
stakeholders, (both creditor and noncreditor), and their expectations of what they would receive in 
a bankruptcy scenario based on their respective contractual relations with the debtor.  
 For LoPucki, the way to solve the collective action problem is to place trust in the debtor’s 
board to lead the team and oversee the maximization of value in insolvency.125 LoPucki observes 
that directors “generally dominate the relationship”126 between a firm’s stakeholders. This is how 
the debtor and its stakeholders contract outside of bankruptcy, and so TPT merely extends this 
relationship, with its accompanying directorial leadership, to a restructuring under insolvency 
law.127 The idea is that team members have this in mind at the moment they first join the team.128  
Team members are, on some level, aware that “[p]reservation of the firm's going concern value 
usually requires that much of the team remain in place and continue to produce during a 
reorganization… [though] adjustments to the team production arrangement may be necessary.”129 
The initial contractual relations under TPT incorporate insolvency law and pre-emptively consent 
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to a reorganization.130 In other words, “[b]y leaving the board in full control, while at the same 
time limiting creditors and shareholders to their bankruptcy entitlements, the Team Production 
contract has, in effect, granted the non-legally enforceable entitlements of team member priority 
over the legally enforceable claims of creditors and interests of shareholders.”131 Much like Warren 
then, LoPucki favours restructuring to liquidation, insofar as the goal is, whenever possible, to 
keep the “team” together and its arrangement in place. The justification, says LoPucki, is that a 
going concern business will have assets with sufficient value to satisfy the team’s entitlements and 
“assure creditors and shareholders of eventual payment of the liquidation values to which they are 
entitled.”132 TPT does not entirely dismiss liquidation, recognizing that a debtor should only 
remain operational if benefits from the continuation of the business exceed the value of its 
liquidation.133 However, LoPucki asserts that TPT is capable of justifying reorganization over 
liquidation that could yield greater value.134 He explains that “the sale should occur only when the 
directors choose to sell, the unambiguous contract of a team member entitles that member to a sale, 
or the sale is for the benefit of a non-team member.”135 A sale to a third party who pays a premium 
but then “default[s] on team entitlements reduces rather than increases social wealth.”136 The 
implication here is that the short term gain from the premium is outweighed by longer term gains 
from continuing to operate the business and thus benefitting its production team. Essentially, TPT 
considers insolvency law a useful tool for ensuring that a firm can meet the nonbankruptcy 
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entitlements of its team members.137 That is, team members play dual roles, where: “the firm 
becomes an adversary to creditors and shareholders with respect to their formal claims, but 
continues to represent them as a fiduciary with respect to their team production entitlements.”138 
(vii) Economic Theory of the Firm 
 Whereas LoPucki directly challenges CBT, drawing more from Warren than from Jackson, 
Jassmine Girgis’139 approach is closer to Jackson and Baird’s focus on economic rights. Girgis 
draws a connection between the economic theory of the firm and insolvency law.140 In essence, a 
corporation is taken to be made up of a composite of contractual relations, which “formation will 
occur so long as it is efficient to form it, meaning so long as it costs less to coordinate these 
activities within a firm than it does in the market.”141 The value of a firm as a going concern thus 
extends beyond its asset value, and into the development and preservation of this bundle of 
relations.142 Corporate restructuring law is thought to support this notion of value, because it is 
typically aimed at the reorganization of a debtor with a view to maintaining going concern value, 
continuing the business with very few changes to the value-generating web of contracts.143 Girgis 
questions whether this is still the case. Much of insolvency law was formulated at a period in time 
where the structure of a corporation was quite different from what it is today.144 The proposition 
is: “if firm assets are less specific to their particular firms, and are more capable of being utilized 
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in other firms, then they need not stay within the debtor firm to retain their value.”145 In simple 
terms: 
[k]eeping an insolvent company going is one of the main purposes of restructuring 
legislation, in order to maintain the company’s going concern value. It is therefore an 
implicit acknowledgement that intangible value exists in the company when courts work 
with the creditors and creditors’ claims are compromised in an effort to achieve a plan. 
Therefore, the entire reason behind restructuring is to save that going concern value, 
namely the elements of a firm that contribute to that intangible economic value.146 
But if the nature of the corporation has changed such that assets need not remain with a 
firm to generate value, this in turn would invite some level of liquidation and raises questions about 
whether going concern value is firm-specific.147 This harkens back to CBT, as then the focus of 
insolvency law—if one assumes that the nature of the corporation has indeed changed to this 
degree—is to recognize and uphold economic rights. Girgis is careful to note that restructuring 
proceedings may still be the appropriate choice for firms with certain kinds of assets and structures. 
For instance, looking at contractual relation networks, Girgis states that “part of the value in that 
network comes from the relationship between the individuals and the assets, so even assuming the 
transfer is possible, some value would nonetheless be lost if the assets were not transferred along 
with the network.”148 This is a point which, she recognizes, generates some debate in the literature, 
resulting in uncertainties over the viability of duplicating a firm’s network.  
Girgis’ arguments raise concerns about changes in firms’ assets and capital structures not 
being reflected by legislation. Referring to the trend of liquidations under the CCAA, for example, 
Girgis states: “the way courts have been responding to applications for liquidation under the CCAA 
may be a response to the changing nature of corporations and how they perceive restructuring 
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legislation can and should be dealing with it.”149 The point here is that by allowing the use of the 
CCAA—originally meant to maintain debtors’ value as going concerns—to carry out the very 
thing it was enacted to avoid may signal that restructuring legislation has been outpaced by the 
evolution of the structure of the modern corporation. Accordingly, this view does not so much 
focus on issues of vulnerability or noncreditor concerns, but considers whether insolvency law 
currently reflects the true nature of firms and provides the necessary tools to maximize the value 
of an insolvent firm’s assets. 
(viii) Contract Bankruptcy 
In keeping with the tradition of law and economics theorists, especially CBT, Alan 
Schwartz’s approach also prefers to focus on the parties’ initial, pre-insolvency, contractual 
decisions.150 This approach envisions an insolvency system whose rules serve only two purposes: 
“[they are] necessary to protect the integrity of the system itself,” or foster effective solutions ex 
post “when the parties cannot reach the efficient outcome on their own.”151 For Schwartz, 
insolvency law is aimed primarily towards maximizing firm value and lowering “the costs of 
realizing that value.”152 The state of insolvency law is such that parties are forced to renegotiate 
their contractual relations ex post to reach resolution.153 Debtors are not permitted to contract for 
specific bankruptcy procedures, and so are not always able to contract with creditors in a way best 
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geared towards maximizing insolvency payments, such that “firms must [sometimes] pay too much 
for debt capital when projects are funded.”154  
Schwartz considers insolvency law to be an integral part of business law.155 However, 
“[o]ne size cannot fit all,”156 and so the parties should be able to decide which system of insolvency 
law to use.157 One of the central tensions in insolvency is that: “the firm’s managers or owners will 
prefer the bankruptcy system that is more likely to permit the firm to survive or to enable them to 
enjoy control privileges for a longer time if it ultimately fails[,]… [whereas] creditors will prefer 
the system that maximizes the firm's net expected insolvency return because creditors can recover 
only monetary returns.”158 Moreover, these privileges are difficult or impossible to quantify in 
court, which is reflected in lending agreements’ inability to efficiently limit this spending, resulting 
in a “source of conflict between the firm and its creditors.”159  This divergence in motivations, 
Schwartz contends, might be best resolved at the initial contracting stage, i.e., when lending is 
initially negotiated.160 A debtor chooses an ideal insolvency system “when it picks the system that 
maximizes the sum of monetary returns and private benefits.”161 
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of options available in insolvency, i.e., from reorganization to liquidation, and variations thereof; See ibid at 1823 for 
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The problem then is that “[f]irms thus face the difficult problem of choosing between a 
suboptimal capital structure that would avoid bankruptcy or reduce bankruptcy costs and an 
otherwise optimal capital structure that will compel the firm, if insolvent, to use a suboptimal 
bankruptcy system.”162 As a solution, Schwartz proposes that a debtor can contract with multiple 
different creditors at different times to reach the most efficient outcomes vis-à-vis insolvency.163 
Efficiency here means selecting the insolvency system that allows for the best possible satisfaction 
of creditors of the protection and resolution of their eventual claims, in order that the debtor may 
receive the highest possible amount of funds therefrom.164 Allowing this form of insolvency 
contracting lowers the cost of credit and affords the debtor with the best funding so that it may be 
less restrained in its choice of projects to undertake.165 Since this form of contracting is not legal, 
what actually happens in practice is the renegotiation of the initial lending contract, which 
produces financing constraints for debtor firms.166 
Schwartz’s approach accordingly coincides with CBT, especially with Baird,167 in that he 
sees “[t]he major goal of business law is to maximize social wealth… [and the] bankruptcy system 
best realizes… [this goal] by maximizing the value of bankrupt estates.”168 Additionally, Schwartz 
would limit objectives outside of wealth maximization, preferring instead to focus efforts on 
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maximizing a debtor’s insolvency value, and thus lowering the cost of debt financing.169 Concerns 
like the “interests of the community” are thus not essential aims of insolvency law, because there 
are usually competitive substitutes for a debtor firm, which the community can weigh with the 
costs of retaining the debtor firm when it is seriously insolvent.170 Similarly, Schwartz’s approach 
might unfairly favor stronger parties at the negotiating table, particularly given the inherent 
obstacles for weaker, less experienced, and less commercially sophisticated parties. Like CBT, 
Schwartz prefers a contractarian approach, which limits insolvency legislation to addressing the 
collective action problem, and protects and upholds parties’ nonbankruptcy entitlements. The ideal 
system for Schwartz is one that provides “parties with a default system, but also with a set of 
additional systems among which parties can choose,”171 thus favouring minimal intervention by 
the state in the realm of insolvency law. 
Like Schwartz, Baird’s more recent take on insolvency law alongside Robert Rasmussen 
also strongly favours a free market approach.172 These authors argue that “the ability of investors 
to contract among themselves and the presence of liquid markets for going concerns undercut the 
need for a law of corporate reorganizations.”173 Baird and Rasmussen distinguish between control 
and cash-flow rights; the former are “rights to deploy a firm’s assets,”174 and the latter “parcel 
financial claims[,]… specify[ing] how the returns from an enterprise should be distributed.”175 
Crucially, and the source of many of Girgis’s above arguments, the modern firm is structured with 
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a proactive strategy in place to deal with potential financial dire straits.176 Investors contract among 
themselves over control rights, which Baird and Rasmussen say does away with many concerns 
purportedly addressed by insolvency law.177 Insolvency law recognizes that when insolvency 
happens, control rights may shift from a firm’s internal actors (i.e., the board), to creditors, which 
can lead to negative results.178 Yet while this is a principal concern and raison d’être for insolvency 
law,179 Baird and Rasmussen maintain that modern creditors can anticipate such difficulties, and 
know to restrain destructive use of control rights without it.180 
These authors consider that such rights are not inherently intransigent, in that they are 
dispensed by corporate/securities law, and lending agreements, all of which can serve to allocate 
control in diligent, albeit different, ways.181 Further, so long as these rights retain effective 
management when the firm is doing well, and replace management when it is not, there is no need 
for insolvency law to step in.182 In the modern era, especially in the American and Canadian 
context, the debtor-in-possession (DIP) model of insolvency law provides senior creditors with a 
certain authoritative primacy.183 That is, DIP financing means that a debtor’s major lender(s) will 
exercise power over management tantamount to an overriding, supervisory authority.184 Baird and 
Rasmussen are unphased by this however, stating: “the senior lender who will not be paid in full 
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will more likely exercise control in a sensible fashion than will managers whose net worth depends 
on continuation or a bankruptcy judge whose training is usually not in business operations.”185 
Given the tendency of such lenders to prefer selling off assets, it is unsurprising that these authors 
conclude that big corporations are making use of restructuring legislation principally for 
liquidation.186 
Quite aside from the tendency of senior (usually secured) creditors to dominate in this way, 
two major changes that call into question the value of restructuring law are the capital structure of 
the modern firm, and the market therefor.187 Baird and Rasmussen point out that “[t]he specialized 
assets of a firm today are often intangible… [and in] a winner-take-all economy, such assets are 
likely to have value only for the firms that flourish and not the ones that encounter financial 
distress.”188 This means that even in a firm where value is derived from a team of individuals 
(intangible assets), it is rarely the case that value is inherently tied to their remaining in a specific 
firm.189 Baird and Rasmussen suggest that value is instead found in the contracts that keep these 
individuals together, which, while incurring costs of their own, may be assigned to or drawn up 
for different firms, with infinite variability.190 Even hard assets, like mines or breweries, are of 
little value if they are not accompanied by a promising business plan.191 It is for these reasons that 
Baird and Rasmussen find it hard to justify insolvency law, stating: “[o]ne can point to neither the 
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size of a firm alone nor the existence of firm-specific assets to conclude that corporation 
reorganization law has an important role to play in our modem economy.”192 
(ix) Bankruptcy & Community Interests  
Karen Gross’s approach is critical of law and economics-oriented theorists, and more on-
brand with Warren.193 Gross finds such theories too restricted, given their narrow focus on 
quantifiable value.194 She especially takes issue with their neglect of the interests of the 
community.195 Further, Gross contends that law and economics theories of insolvency law take a 
negative view of human nature, categorizing it as inherently selfish as opposed to prone to a “desire 
for altruism.”196 Much like Warren, she advocates for an expanded view of insolvency law that 
would encompass more than just relations between debtor and creditors.197 Gross approaches 
insolvency law from the perspective of communitarianism and feminism: “feminism addresses 
how to think about people and the world in which we live[,]… [which the] experiences of women 
have served to reveal,”198 and “[communitarianism] views individuals as connected to each other 
and obligated to act in the interests of the good of the community, even if that curtails some 
individual freedom.”199 Together, these approaches contrast with law and economics insolvency 
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theorists’ focus on individual rights,200 with Gross’s approach favouring an expanded, and more 
flexible economic modeling of value in insolvency.201 
 Taking community interests into account does not mean such interests necessarily coincide 
with a debtor firm’s.202 That is, it does not connote that failing companies must be saved.203 Nor 
does it mean that community interests take priority over all other concerns.204 Community interests 
are not always paramount but the inherent difficulty or impossibility of plugging them numerically 
into an equation should not automatically disqualify them.205 Rather, Gross maintains that 
reshaping our understanding of value, and expanding the scope of considerations beyond what is 
quantifiable is the ultimate goal in optimizing our understandings in insolvency law. 
(x) Conclusions About Insolvency Theory 
 The foregoing theories provide a variety of viewpoints on whether and to what extent the 
state should be the principal arbiter when a firm finds itself in insolvency. One thing most of these 
theories can agree on is that insolvency law resolves the collective action problem.206 From there, 
deviations primarily centre on the scope of insolvency law (i.e., narrower focus on creditor 
recovery and wealth maximization, or broader consideration of socioeconomic concerns), and its 
adaptation to changes in business. Notably, those who advocate for a reduced role—or no role at 
all—for insolvency law state that changes in business/capital structures have far outpaced 
legislation meant to deal with much simpler structures. Such advocates favour a hands-off 
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approach, in light of the fact that a market for the sale of financially distressed firms exists. Critics 
argue the opposite, maintaining that these approaches lead to diminishing consideration of and 
protections for vulnerable stakeholders of a debtor firm. Accordingly, they seek to extend the scope 
of insolvency law. The theories also illustrate the sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit 
motivations of the parties, (i.e., debtor, and secured and unsecured creditors), and how these are 
reflected in the different proposed approaches to insolvency law. A clear understanding of the 
theories that attempt to make sense of insolvency law is crucial for any analysis that seeks to 
ascribe changes to the law. By situating these theories, and then observing how they manifest in 
insolvency policy, we can better understand the CCAA itself. Before turning specifically to the 
CCCA, the following section examines major Canadian and international policy guides and 
documents, to observe how insolvency theory figures into the building blocks of insolvency law. 
PART II – THEORY REFLECTED IN POLICY: GUIDING INSOLVENCY LAW 
(i) United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) & World Bank 
UNCITRAL provides what is probably the most comprehensive policy and legislative 
guide for insolvency law: the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (the Guide).207 This widely 
cited document is a result of consultations with stakeholders in the international insolvency 
community, geared towards creating a cohesive set of principles and suggestions on how to best 
structure national insolvency regimes.208 The UNCITRAL guide provides a list of what it considers 
to be widely accepted objectives. These reflect many of the theories we have observed here. The 
list includes: promoting certainty in the market, maximizing asset value, balancing between 
reorganization and liquidation of a debtors’ business, treating like creditors equally, fostering 
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“timely, efficient and impartial resolution[s],” preserving debtor assets for “equitable distribution 
to creditors,” incentivizing transparency through information sharing, protecting existing creditor 
rights and priorities, and integrating a cross-border insolvency framework.209 
Many of these objectives echo what has been found in the various theoretical approaches 
to be the most important feature(s) of insolvency law. For instance, in recognizing the need to 
maximize asset value, the Guide notes that this “is often furthered by achieving a balance of the 
risks allocated between the parties.”210 Likewise, equal treatment for creditors is not about being 
“treated identically, but in a manner that reflects the different bargains they have struck with the 
debtor.”211 The Guide thus consistently suggests a balance between opposing positions, such as 
distributing payment and distributing risk, the favourability of a reorganization versus 
liquidation,212 and careful consideration of the preferences of stronger and weaker parties.213 
Importantly, the Guide’s view “is predicated on the basic economic theory that greater value may 
be obtained from keeping the essential components of a business together, rather than breaking 
them up and disposing of them in fragments.”214 The accuracy of this view is increasingly 
challenged, as we saw when considering Baird and Rasmussen, Girgis, and Schwartz, among 
others. Still, the Guide does not necessarily uphold reorganization as the only or even leading 
option available in the case of a corporate insolvency. 
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It stipulates that the key is predictability,215 and that an approach that has strong positive 
tendencies towards reorganization “should not result in establishing a safe haven for moribund 
enterprises.”216 The Guide essentially recommends that an insolvency scheme include a sampling 
of strategies suggested in the different theoretical approaches for dealing with insolvency concerns. 
It proposes that insolvency law balance different objectives by “reapportioning the risks of 
insolvency in a way that suits a State’s economic, social and political goals,”217 while cautioning 
against overloading insolvency law with issues that may be best resolved outside of it.218 Perhaps 
most importantly, the Guide recognizes that “society is constantly evolving, [so] insolvency law 
cannot be static, but requires reappraisal at regular intervals to ensure that it meets current social 
needs.”219 
The World Bank has also developed a set of principles on effective insolvency systems, 
which it describes as “a distillation of international best practice on design aspects of these 
[insolvency law] systems, emphasizing contextual, integrated solutions and the policy choices 
involved in developing those solutions.”220 Though the World Bank’s analysis contains some 
differences, its goal is to provide consistency with the UNCITRAL Guide.221 As such, its 
enumerated principles do not significantly depart from the Guide’s, touching on each of the 
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objectives mentioned there, adding only that an insolvency system should operate harmoniously 
with a nation’s existing legal and commercial business practices.222 Likewise, the World Bank 
recognizes the need to balance competing theories and approaches to insolvency law, primarily 
through information sharing and stakeholder representation mechanisms.223 
(ii) Industry Canada  
In its review of Canadian insolvency legislation, Industry Canada—since renamed 
Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISEDC)224—also largely reflects 
UNCITRAL’s balancing approach. In fact, its list of objectives for insolvency policy references 
an analysis of the Guide itself.225 ISEDC states that “[t]he objectives underlying the BIA and 
CCAA include minimizing the impact of a debtor’s insolvency on all stakeholders by pursuing an 
equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets and, where possible, by rehabilitation of the debtor.”226 
These are best achieved by legislation that embodies the same principles/objectives espoused by 
the UNCITRAL Guide and the World Bank.227 Moreover, ISEDC stresses the important function 
of insolvency law in the economy, as it provides a measure of certainty in lending practices, which 
“influences credit market risks… [and] can affect the cost and availability of credit.”228 
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(iii) Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade & Commerce 
In 2003, the above Senate Committee carried out a review of insolvency legislation in 
Canada. In its report, it maintained that the essential ingredients for a successful insolvency system 
are: “fairness, accessibility, predictability, responsibility, cooperation, efficiency and 
effectiveness.”229 Of these, it maintained that fairness reigns supreme.230 Like the UNCITRAL 
Guide and the World Bank, the Committee was careful to balance between the opposing positions 
of a free market-oriented approach and a rehabilitation-focused approach:231  
The redistributive effects of bankruptcy must be considered from the perspective of 
fairness, since bankruptcy-related losses for creditors may lead to higher costs of credit for 
those who pay their debts fully and in a timely manner. In some sense, fairness would 
dictate that the burden faced by those who pay their debts must not be too great because of 
the actions and omissions of those who do not.232 
Notwithstanding these statements, the Committee uses language that seems to favour the 
approaches of Warren and Gross. It states that insolvency law “must consider the social and 
economic costs of bankruptcy and ensure that these costs are minimized and shared 
appropriately… [and] must also facilitate the efficient reallocation of resources in the event of 
bankruptcy.”233 Ultimately, the Committee also reflects on the need to balance between reasonable 
rehabilitative measures for debtors with spreading the losses amongst creditors equitably.234 
(iv) Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform 
Around the time of the above Committee’s report, the Insolvency Institute of Canada and 
the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals came together to deliver 
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the Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform Report (the JTF Report).235 Among its 
consideration of Canadian insolvency legislation, reforms, and concerns, the JTF defined the 
principles which guided their recommendations. These were largely the same objectives that we 
have seen in the above documents: “going concern solutions that can minimize the economic and 
social costs resulting from insolvency”236 are generally preferred to liquidations (unless there is 
more value in the latter),237 this is a business decision best left to the parties and not to the courts,238 
and insolvency law needs a proper balance of flexibility and certainty to foster creative solutions 
and workable transactions.239 
(v) Conclusions Regarding Insolvency Policy 
The preceding policy documents illustrate attempts to balance between opposing 
approaches in insolvency law theory. The result is typically recommendations which address key 
concerns and proposed solutions examined in the theory. Policy recommendations and proposed 
principles/objectives usually take a middle ground approach, although the scope is always broader 
than a singular focus on creditor recovery and wealth maximization. In the following pages, a 
specific insolvency statute, the CCAA, is examined to observe how theory and policy take root in 
the practice of restructuring law in Canada. The review of theory and policy thus far situates many 
of the issues in the CCAA caselaw and literature. As is discussed below, the balancing approach 
observed in insolvency policy finds purchase in judges’ understandings of the objectives of the 
CCAA.  
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PART III – THE CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY & INSOLVENCY LAW REGIME 
 Canada has two principal insolvency law regimes,240 the CCAA and the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act (BIA).241  The CCAA has been defined as “an enactment intended to permit a 
compromise or arrangement between an insolvent company and its unsecured and secured 
creditors, or any class of them.”242 This is more than the Act itself says about its purposes,243 
though the key principles of the CCAA may be summarized as follows: 
1. Some insolvent companies are more valuable as going concerns than they are on 
liquidation.  
2. Contracts with creditors, trading partners and other stakeholders must be adjusted to 
preserve the insolvent company as a going concern.  
3. Due to the threat that creditors may exercise their enforcement rights and the complexity 
and interdependency of adjustments with a large number of constituencies, a formal system 
of reorganization under court supervision is required.  
4. The decision to reorganize should be made with the consent of the debtor.244 
Even more perplexing, the CCAA does not define key terms like ‘restructuring’, ‘plan of 
arrangement’, or ‘compromise’.245 This makes it an Act that has historically depended on the 
interpretation of the courts.246 Like its counterparts throughout the world, the CCAA serves as a 
continuous experiment in the application of insolvency law theory, both in its development through 
caselaw, and through the writings of scholars who have sought define its theoretical underpinnings. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Callidus aptly summarized this: “[u]ltimately, the relative weight 
that the different objectives of the CCAA take on in a particular case may vary based on the factual 
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circumstances, the stage of the proceedings, or the proposed solutions that are presented to the 
court for approval.”247 As discussed directly above, analysis of the CCAA yields a variety of 
theoretical approaches, which may be described “as a fusion of two competing theories on the 
policy of bankruptcy and insolvency law,” CBT and LDT.248 Some authors have also suggested 
that there is no clear theoretical basis for the CCAA.249  
The overarching principle in Canadian insolvency law is fairness,250 which informs the 
approval of the plan of arrangement under the CCAA, and is also inseparable from a court’s 
analysis, regardless of what issues are before it. One extreme manifestation of fairness is 
consideration of the public interest, which may be explained as meaning that insolvency law 
“reaches beyond purely commercial interests to [encompass] multiple interests affected by firm 
failure.”251 In the first part of this Chapter, we observed theories around the purpose and function 
of insolvency law. The opposing elements of CBT and LDT are reflected in the objectives of the 
CCAA. This is because there is a spectrum of theory, from which the Canadian insolvency law 
regimes draw their defining principles. Janis Sarra outlines three basic approaches: Market Theory, 
Debt Collection Theory, and Rehabilitation Theory.252 Briefly, Market Theory, as its name 
denotes, gives primacy to the operation of the market, whereby insolvency law serves only “to 
clarify priority of creditors’ claims, to assist with liquidation or the smooth transition of control to 
creditors.”253 Accordingly, this theory prefers skeletal/flexible legislation, and leaves it to the 
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freehand of the market to determine how best to “maximize creditor return,” whether through 
restructuring or liquidating.254 On a similar note, Debt Collection Theory is also focused on 
economic rights but “differs from pure market theory because it endorses state intervention to 
assist with collective action problems.”255 The sole purpose of insolvency law for Debt Collection 
Theory is to maximize the pool of assets, promoting the most efficient distribution thereof to 
creditors.256 Finally, Rehabilitation Theory is principally about preservation of the debtor as a 
going concern, (i.e., continuing to operate).257 This theory takes the stance that “insolvent 
corporations may be so important to national or local economies that these interests take 
precedence over original capital investments… [such that] the state is justified in compromising 
existing creditor claims in order for the debtor corporation to attract new capital.”258 
 As may be evident given the discussions in Parts I and II, none of these theoretical 
approaches alone defines insolvency law or policy, nor do they provide the sole influence for the 
CCAA. For instance, Market Theory is not practical, given that there is significant state 
intervention into the market outside of insolvency law, including “securities regulation and 
corporations and competition statutes.”259 We have already explored the shortcomings of Debt 
Collection Theory, which is principally that it is too narrow. Like Market Theory, both are “limited 
in their analysis because their definition of interest recognizes only equity and debt capital 
investment in the firm… [ignoring] other investments that contribute value and which may be 
vitally important to decision making in terms of wealth maximization.”260 Lastly, Rehabilitation 
Theory lacks economic sense, in that certain debtors will necessarily be better off liquidating, and 
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a policy of keeping a firm going no matter what may only result in a gain for shareholders and, 
ultimately, an inevitable liquidation.261 The spectrum of theory thus ranges from barebones 
legislation and little government interference, (Market Theory)—Debt Collection Theory is closest 
to Market Theory, but not as extreme—to comprehensive legislation and a strong role for the state 
(Rehabilitation Theory). Where does this leave us? 
 The CCAA draws from each of these theories in turn. Market Theory underscores the 
importance of the business of the debtor, in that a successful plan must be a “viable business 
plan.”262 However, such a plan must also take heed of the socioeconomic environment in which a 
firm operates, taking care to account for factors beyond simple repayment of creditors.263 Warren’s 
LDT is closer to the extreme of Rehabilitation Theory, which theory inspires our consideration of 
the public interest, along with other vulnerability and fairness analyses. Rehabilitation Theory also 
delineates our default rule of preferring reorganization to liquidation. One last point is worth 
noting, and that is that the CCAA also has the principal objective of “mitigating collective action 
problems.”264 As will be explored further in Chapter Two, one of its means of achieving this 
objective is by employing the monitor as a neutral information intermediary. This flows directly 
from Debt Collection Theory, and perhaps more specifically from Jackson and Baird’s 
understanding of how collective proceedings that operate in harmony with nonbankruptcy 
entitlements provide the best possible venue for mediating bankruptcy and insolvency. The CCAA 
thus embraces multiple policy objectives,265 drawing from the whole spectrum of theories. But is 
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this a satisfactory explanation for the change from its 1933 use to avoid liquidation,266 to the 
current practice of liquidating CCAAs? Is it enough to say that the CCAA’s objectives and policy 
goals are undulating? What does this mean as regards the purpose and function of insolvency law? 
Courts and scholars have long grappled with the tension between using the CCAA for a 
restructuring (rescue) or a liquidation (sale). Exploration of the arguments for and against each 
approach help to reveal much about the CCAA’s theoretical core. 
 Reorganization may be understood simply as “arrangements between debtors and creditors 
under which the creditors agree to accept something less than full and timely payment of their 
debts.”267 The resulting reduction of creditor claims comes about through a careful balance 
between preservation and modification of existing legal rights.268 Though the CCAA has 
historically been understood to prefer reorganization where possible,269 “[i]t should be kept in 
mind, however, that the purpose… is not to force a reorganization of the company so that it 
survives at all costs… [but] to facilitate a reorganization that is fair under the circumstances.”270 
After all, liquidations can often incur lower costs than the deliberative process of negotiating a 
restructuring,271 and courts have increasingly approved such transactions where they yield better 
results.272 The main tension seems to be not only that the CCAA was not designed for such sales, 
but also that “[w]hen liquidation is avoided and the firm continues in business, junior classes of 
claimants are able to use uncertainty over the value of the firm to argue for more favourable 
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treatment.”273 The flipside is that stronger, often secured, creditors typically prefer a liquidation, 
and so may exert pressure to pursue one, regardless of whether it would produce the best value for 
the creditors as a whole.274 This perhaps stark practice is not new. In fact, “[t]he Act as it was 
originally envisaged facilitated the resolution of differences between the corporate debtor and the 
secured financier… [wherein] unsecured creditors had no leverage over the debtor.”275 
 The “CCAA process is geared towards the development of a plan of arrangement that will 
be presented before the creditors for their acceptance or rejection.”276 Understood in this way, 
liquidating CCAAs alter the process, making use of the flexibility of the statute to facilitate 
“diminution of the private law rights of a third party or the granting of a judicially authorized 
preference usually in favour of commercially sophisticated and powerful creditors.”277 This 
tension between restructuring and liquidation is also present, albeit somewhat differently, in the 
United States counterpart to the CCAA: Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.278 American 
commentators suggest that to conceive of creditor recovery maximization as the topmost objective 
of insolvency legislation “is putting the cart before the horse.”279 Like Canadian scholars who 
maintain that the CCAA is primarily intended to facilitate restructurings, (where possible), these 
American commentators stress that “[r]ehabilitation remains a predominant, if not the 
predominant, objective.”280 Interestingly, they also recognize the influence of creditors, 
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particularly powerful senior/secured creditors, and suggest that insolvency legislation needs to be 
strengthened to realign it with the goal of rehabilitation, and lessen the effects of creditor control.281  
 Two elements of the theoretical debate and CCAA policy maelstrom are especially 
noteworthy. These are that history has revealed a slow but sure change in the use of insolvency 
legislation, and that strong/secured creditors are one of the most influential parties. Indeed, these 
themes are so pervasive, that conceivably observing them together should reveal a deeper 
understanding of the CCAA, and Canadian insolvency law generally. 
 The answer to lingering questions is perhaps as simple as considering the history of the 
legislation. In Century Services, the Court states: “[i]n order to properly interpret the provisions, 
it is necessary to examine the history of the CCAA, its function amidst the body of insolvency 
legislation enacted by Parliament, and the principles that have been recognized in the 
jurisprudence.”282 In her recent book,283 Virginia Torrie traces the history of the CCAA, and offers 
an analysis that might resolve these leftover questions. Torrie notes that, from its inception as a 
remedy for bondholders,284 to its current use, the CCAA has essentially remained a ‘secured 
creditor statute’.285 To summarize Torrie’s text is beyond the scope of this project, however a few 
key points will suffice to outline her argument. As stated, the Act’s inception as a bondholder 
remedy favoured the interests of secured creditors, being the bondholders themselves. At this time, 
based on the nature of credit, such bondholders not only had a security interest, but also stood to 
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profit from the continuing success of the debtor company, much like today’s 
equity(share)holders.286   Skipping ahead a few years, while there were complaints that the CCAA 
was not being used fairly, interest groups representing bondholders and unsecured creditors—after 
many years negotiating—came together to agree to a restructuring statute that would still protect 
the weaker (unsecured) creditors.287  
Over the next few decade, from the 1950s until the 1980s, CCAA underwent a period of 
scant use as the Canadian economy soared before facing its next recession(s).288 At this time, 
finance had undergone its own changes, the most significant of which, in terms of the CCAA, was 
that companies were borrowing from banks instead of raising money in the capital markets.289 
These lenders “relied on the priority and strength of their security vis-à-vis other secured and 
unsecured creditors, and displayed little interest in coordinating  with smaller creditors in cases of 
debtor default.”290 Such lending practices, especially the lack of precautions banks exercised, led 
to some being dangerously exposed to defaulting debtors.291 As provincial and federal 
governments stepped in to avoid economic catastrophe, their solution was to offer funding for the 
restructurings of afflicted lenders.292 As Torrie puts it: “[d]uring the 1980s recession, courts, banks, 
and the provincial and federal governments effectively (re)affirmed corporate reorganization 
through insolvency law and receivership as a commercially and politically desirable response to 
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the insolvency of large firms.”293 This government solution was met with no opposition, as it had 
one of the strongest votes of confidence on its side, that of secured creditors.294 
The reason, Torrie argues, why secured creditors have been so well positioned to have their 
interested reflected in the CCAA is by virtue of its skeletal nature and strong reliance on the 
judiciary.295 Insolvency law in Canada does not undergo consistent, rapid, or even wide-reaching 
reform, and so “there is significant scope for new ideas to infiltrate and influence CCAA law 
developments via case law rather than through the relatively rare instances of formal insolvency 
law reform in Canada.”296 By pursuing change in the courts, secured creditors keep the impetus of 
legal rule changes on their side, because while they may lose out on the occasional case, they will 
typically be able to “advocate a specific outcome in one case, but leave their options open about 
how potential future cases might be resolved.”297 
Torrie’s analysis is persuasive in that it demonstrates how an understanding of historical 
context elucidates the workings of insolvency law, in this case of a specific statute:  the CCAA.298 
The cyclical nature of the economy, and the changing nature of some of its components—like 
credit—precipitate changes in this unique area of the law designed to respond to negative economic 
consequences. The “actors” understandings of the CCAA in a given time have been significantly 
shaped by the broader context of their respective place in history.”299 Similarly, our understanding 
of the CCAA, a statute of multiple objectives, spanning the gamut of the theoretical spectrum, is 
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perhaps also influenced by our place in history. Viewed this way, it makes more sense why courts 
place more or less weight on value maximization, debtor rehabilitation, and the correlating choice 
of whether to restructure or liquidate. The answer, one lawyers are often criticized for resorting to, 
is that it depends, although following Torrie it would be more correct to say: it depends on the 
historical context.  
At the outset of this Chapter, we considered that the common law has widely accepted that 
insolvency law functions to mitigate the collective action problem, reorganize healthy businesses 
so they might continue, and rehabilitate debtors so they may begin anew.300 In the context of the 
CCAA, a more accurate understanding might be that the first is a given, and the second and third 
are negotiable, depending on the circumstances of the day. 
PART IV - CONCLUSION 
 This historical analysis provides a lens through which we can examine the statute, its 
influence, and the sources of its continued use in much higher definition. For instance, the change 
in the judiciary in the 1980s and 1990s into a “far more policy-conscious and even activist” bench 
seems to coincide with the pronouncement of LDT and related theories that supported a larger than 
economics approach to insolvency law.301 This too seems to reflect Torrie’s notion that historical 
context informs actors’ understandings of the CCAA and their role therein. Likewise, Girgis’ 
observations about the changing, or already changed, nature of the structure of modern firms 
perhaps suggest that we are at a point in history where legislation dealing with business may need 
to adapt to this evolution. As we have travelled through time from nearly a century ago, where this 
statute merely remedied bondholders, we can observe the confluence of interests and protections 
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that today make up a very flexible and highly used statute. LDT, and the extreme of Rehabilitation 
Theory, has surely influenced an increased regard for unsecured creditors, and the oversight and 
intermediary role played by the monitor, originally a creation of the courts.302 Likewise, the rising 
trend in liquidating CCAAs surely draws on value maximization, a central tenet of CBT. What the 
CCAA does that has differentiated it from other insolvency law statutes, is that it allows judges 
the discretion to act on instances of unfairness or foul play, when the actors in a proceeding 
impinge on one of the CCAA’s multiple policy objectives. In some cases, value maximization will 
be the goal, whereas in others, preservation may very well be the desired outcome.303  Yet no 
matter the scenario, the CCAA by necessity operates to subdue the collective action problem, and 
asks judges to only approve a plan that most fairly resolves disputing claims while preserving the 
best possible value. As Janis Sarra has stated:  
Any restructuring plan devised must create efficiencies and enhance the value of the 
corporation such that it will be able to successfully compete in the market place. Insolvency 
law must be situated in the social and economic context in which corporations operate, 
recognizing that multiple factors affect restructuring decisions, beyond narrow assessment 
of commercial requirements on an individual case-by-case basis.304 
Extending this multi-theory, or multi-policy, understanding, along with Torrie’s historical 
approach, we can better discern the nature of the practice of CCAA today. The CCAA is not simply 
the product of applying the theories we have observed to real-world cases. Such legislation is often 
the product of a confluence of contributing factors, such as abstract ideas, ardently defended 
interests, and the adequacy of the institutions responsible for its application.305 Courts have 
observed that it is the flexibility of the CCAA scheme which “permits a broad balancing of these 
[multiple] objectives and the multiple stakeholder interests engaged when a corporation faces 
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insolvency.”306 As mentioned at the outset, this flexibility is embodied in the broad discretion 
afforded to CCAA judges, whose repeated practices have, over time, been codified to form part of 
the legislative scheme.307 The monitor itself is a creature of CCAA judicial discretion,308 which, 
as will be observed in the following Chapter, is often located at the centre of the court’s balancing 
of the CCAA’s multiple policy objectives. Accordingly, Chapter One’s literature review of 
insolvency theory, coupled with its examination of those theories in insolvency policy, clarify the 
underpinnings of Canadian insolvency law. Study of the CCAA itself revealed it to be a product 
of these underpinnings, in combination with pressure exerted by secured creditors, themselves 
likely using theory and policy in their arguments for why the law should function as it does today. 
At this moment in the CCAA’s history, pressures are again mounting, only this time the concern 
is around the independence of the monitor.  
This project will suggest that the history of the CCAA, through its cases and its legislative 
amendments, is leading toward further codification of the monitor’s role via its fiduciary duty. 
Consequently, the rest of this study assumes the three broad functions of insolvency law in the 
common law tradition to be true, but understands that they may wax, wane, and be supplemented 
according to changes in the surrounding historical environment. In the following Chapter, the focus 
shifts to the monitor, tracing the history of its role, slowly unpacking the law around it to reveal 
its theoretical/policy inclinations, strengths, weaknesses, and considering how best to model this 
role going forward. Chapter Two will reveal many of the problematic aspects of the role, centering 
on its fiduciary duty as both a cause for concern and the potential solution.  
 
306 Ernst & Young Inc v Essar Global Fund Limited, 2017 ONCA 1014 at para 103[Essar]. 
307 See e.g., Callidus, supra note 4 at paras 67, 86, 91 (“[s]ince 2009, s. 11.2(1) of the CCAA has codified a supervising 
judge’s discretion to approve interim financing, and to grant a corresponding security or charge in favour of the lender 
in the amount the judge considers appropriate” ibid at para 86). 







 The CCAA is Canada’s main statute for restructuring insolvent corporations.309 Its broad 
purpose is to “facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors.”310 
Central to the CCAA’s purpose is the role of the court-appointed monitor.311 Given the skeletal 
nature of the CCAA, courts have historically employed an approach pairing liberal interpretation 
with judicial discretion to “extend the limited words [in the legislation], and create needed tools 
and remedies.”312 The monitor is a trustee and insolvency professional,313 appointed by the court 
in its initial application order,314 to function as the court’s “eyes and ears.”315 It supplements the 
court’s supervisory role with much-needed expertise.316 This Chapter examines the role of the 
monitor, the scope of its powers, and its obligations to remain independent and avoid conflicts of 
interest. The monitor is crucial to the proper functioning of the CCAA regime.  At the same time, 
commentators have raised valid concerns about the monitor’s role and its independence in light of 
the scope of its powers. In Part I, I will review the history and evolution of the monitor’s role. Part 
II examines the concerns with the monitor’s role raised by commentators and in the jurisprudence. 
In Part III, I consider whether the CCAA regime has sufficient checks and balances to address the 
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concerns explored in Part II. Finally, I will conclude that the monitor’s role, as currently conceived, 
requires clarification so that it may perform its intended functions properly. Chapter Three will 
then specifically address the monitor’s fiduciary duty, ultimately suggesting that it be codified in 
response to concerns that it is unclear and that the role is generally exposed to conflict of interest. 
PART I – ORIGINS OF THE MONITOR 
 The inception of the monitor can be traced back to a common practice of CCAA courts in 
the 1980s and 1990s to appoint an accounting firm to perform a supervisory role in the 
proceedings.   This unique role was inspired, in part, by the role of the interim receiver, appointed 
under section 46 of  the BIA.317 The BIA interim receiver is charged with overseeing the property 
of the debtor, often for the purpose of selling such, and in some instances exercising control over 
aspects of its business.318 It too acts as a court-appointed officer, and owes a fiduciary duty to all 
parties with an interest in the proceedings.319 In early CCAA caselaw, courts likened monitors to 
interim receivers,320 and later stressed that the two roles served distinct purposes and functions.321 
Prior to the 1997 amendments to the CCAA which codified the monitor’s role and made it 
mandatory,322 it was common practice for “creditors seeking enhanced disclosure from debtor 
corporations”323 to pursue this appointment. Given the strategic value of selecting the party to play 
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this role, debtors soon circumvented creditors and asked the court to choose their own accounting 
firms.324 Although these early appointments were tasked with “acting as a “watchdog” and 
reporting to the court on the financial affairs of the company,”325 the fact that debtors’ accounting 
firms—often their auditors326—were selected, raised questions about their independence and 
impartiality.327 The courts took the view that the appointed role functioned as an extension of their 
CCAA supervisory capacity,328 and “originally grounded the appointment of a court officer in their 
inherent jurisdiction.”329 That is, courts saw a way to keep an eye on the parties via their appointed 
watchdog. The first330 usage of the term “monitor” is traced to Northland Properties,331 where 
Trainor J, as he then was, said: “I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to appoint an interim receiver 
and spell out the responsibilities of that office such that his true role would be that of a monitor or 
watchdog during this interim period.”332 
The rationale for this practice of appointing monitors, prior to the 1997 amendments, can 
be summarized as follows. Its inception in the 1980s coincided with an economic crisis, such that 
“[t]he appointment of monitors was perceived by the courts and the credit community as a 
compromise between transferring management of the ailing enterprise into entirely new hands, on 
one hand, and putting their faith in existing management not to run the business further into the 
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ground, on the other.”333 In addition to its watchdog role, the monitor was seen as a means of 
mitigating certain costs, especially those pertaining to court challenges for better disclosure of 
debtor financial information.334 This is where the monitor as an information intermediary ensures 
the free flow of information to the stakeholder collective, in a cost-effective manner. Finally, given 
the complexities inherent in a CCAA case, the guidance and leadership of an expert in such matters 
came to be an increasingly necessary and useful element.335  
In its early years, and up until the time of its codification in 1997, the role of the monitor 
could be defined as follows. First and foremost, the monitor is an officer or agent of the court, and 
in that capacity “owes a fiduciary duty to all the parties and an obligation to ensure that one creditor 
is not given an advantage over any other creditor.”336 As considered above, a central justification 
for the role was that the monitor safeguarded creditors’ interests as a whole, by supervising and 
reporting on the debtor’s activities  to the court.337 The strong role of the courts in developing 
CCAA law and practice produced a role that is adaptable, varying case-by-case.338 Although the 
ultimate responsibility for supervising the CCAA process rests with the courts, judges make use 
of the monitor as an adaptable tool through which to exercise the court’s authority and pursue the 
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Canada” (2008) 3:1 Va L & Bus Rev 125 at 141 (“[t]he Monitor is a court-appointed official whose mission, although 
it may vary from case to case, is first and foremost to supervise the reorganization… [though its] main role is to be an 
information intermediary” ibid at 130); See also Vern W DaRe & Alfonso Nocilla. “Bestriding the Narrow World: Is 
It Time to Bifurcate the Role of the CCAA Monitor?”, in J. Sarra, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 18th ed, 2020 





CCAA’s objectives.339 The 1997 amendments, which codified the role in section 11.7,340 upheld 
this flexibility, “confirming that the court maintains the discretion to craft the role… to carry out 
any other functions the court may direct.”341 The CCAA monitor is currently most concretely 
defined by the following sections of the Act.342 First, its appointment in the initial order by the 
supervising judge: 
11.7 (1) When an order is made on the initial application in respect of a debtor company, 
the court shall at the same time appoint a person to monitor the business and financial 
affairs of the company. The person so appointed must be a trustee, within the meaning of 
subsection 2(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act… 
(2) Except with the permission of the court and on any conditions that the court may 
impose, no trustee may be appointed as monitor in relation to a company 
(a) if the trustee is or, at any time during the two preceding years, was 
(i) a director, an officer or an employee of the company, 
(ii) related to the company or to any director or officer of the company, or 
(iii) the auditor, accountant or legal counsel, or a partner or an employee of the auditor, 
accountant or legal counsel, of the company; or 
(b) if the trustee is 
(i) the trustee under a trust indenture issued by the company or any person related to the 
company, or the holder of a power of attorney under an act constituting a hypothec within 
the meaning of the Civil Code of Quebec that is granted by the company or any person 
related to the company, or 
(ii) related to the trustee, or the holder of a power of attorney, referred to in subparagraph 
(i)… 
(3) On application by a creditor of the company, the court may, if it considers it appropriate 
in the circumstances, replace the monitor by appointing another trustee, within the meaning 
of subsection 2(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, to monitor the business and 
financial affairs of the company.343 
 
339 See e.g., Re Stokes, supra note 320 at 5–6; Callidus, supra note 4 at paras 46–48, 52; Julie Himo & Arad Mojtahedi, 
“The Evolving Role of the Eyes and Ears of the Court: Empowering the CCAA Monitor to Initiate Legal Proceedings 
Against Third Parties”, in J. Sarra, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 18th ed, 2020 CanLIIDocs 3594 (“the flexibility 
afforded to the courts has been a hallmark of the Canadian insolvency regime, and has allowed for creative use of the 
acts and their adaptability to conduct ever-more complex restructuring matters efficiently” ibid at 126); See also DaRe 
& Nocilla, supra note 338 at 230. 
340 CCAA, supra note 2. 
341 Knowles, supra note 325; CCAA, supra note 2 at ss 11, 23(1)(k) (the court has the power to “make any order that 
it considers appropriate in the circumstances,” which specifically includes directing the monitor to carry out additional 
functions, ibid). 
342 Note that the following sections do not provide an exhaustive list of all sections of the CCAA dealing with the 
monitor, but merely provide the most pertinent sections. 





Next, the general duties and functions of the monitor, subject to modification by the 
court,344 are found in section 23. These include publishing consistent and timely public notices 
concerning claims,345 investigating and reviewing the debtor’s state of affairs,346 reporting 
thereon,347 filing various reports based on the fruit of its investigations with the court,348 advising 
the court on the soundness of any proposal or plan,349 and making all reports and opinions publicly 
available,350 among other things. Finally, the monitor is bound to “act honestly and in good faith… 
[when] exercising any of his or her powers or in performing any of his or her duties and 
functions.”351 Together, these sections, along with the court’s inherent and statutory jurisdiction,352 
and section 11 discretionary power,353 allow CCAA judges to appoint and configure the role of the 
monitor in each case according to the particular facts of the day.354 
At its most basic configuration, the monitor’s essential role bridging information gaps is 
part of the CCAA’s response to the collective action problem in insolvency.355 The collective 
action problem occurs when individual creditors act unilaterally to enforce their claims, frustrating 
the efforts of creditors claiming thereafter, and ultimately reducing the value that a collective 
 
344 Ibid, s 23(1)(k). 
345 Ibid, s 23(1)(a). 
346 Ibid, s 23(1)(b)–(c). 
347 Ibid, ss 23(1)(c)–(d.1). 
348 Ibid.  
349 Ibid, s 23(1)(i). 
350 Ibid, ss 23(1)(e), (j). 
351 Ibid, s 25, referencing BIA, supra note 241, s 13.5 (prescribed Code of Ethics for trustees). 
352 Callidus, supra note 4 at paras 65–67, citing Century Services, supra note 3 at paras 61–62, 65; See generally G R 
Jackson & Janis Sarra, “Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, 
Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters”, in J Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency 
Law, 2007 (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) [Retrieved from WestlawNext Canada]. 
353 CCAA, supra note 2. 
354 Ibid, s 23(1)(k). 
355 Noah Zucker, Gabriel Faure & Jocelyn T Perreault, “Creditor Activism in CCAA Proceedings: Beyond the Vote”, 






proceeding generates.356 Chapter One alluded to the  monitor’s function as a guiding force which, 
by virtue of its assumed neutrality, brings parties together as a collective while still respecting their 
individual claims. Moreover, the monitor can unburden creditors from their need to investigate the 
debtor on an individual basis, through its own policing and reporting on the debtor’s affairs, 
reducing associated costs. This function is especially beneficial because it produces information 
that the court will defer to when making its final decisions.357 As such, the monitor allays creditor 
concerns over transparency, providing a sense of security to the process.358 The monitor is “the 
eyes and ears of the court,”359 and advises the court in determining “the fairness of any proposed 
plan of arrangement and on orders sought by parties.”360 One experienced monitor explains that 
the typical monitor analyzes the debtor with regards to its past and projected financial trajectory, 
considers available options for increasing the business’ viability, and studies the debtor’s 
competitors, its capital structure, and respective market.361 On the basis of these considerations, 
the monitor then prepares its reports and recommendations.362  
Since its creation by the courts in the 1980s, and following its codification in 1997, the 
monitor’s role “has developed from one of passive observer to one of active participant.”363 
Beginning as a supervisory role that was primarily concerned with disseminating information and 
 
356 See e.g., Sharab Developments Ltd v Zellers Inc (1999), 65 BCLR (3d) 67 (CA) at para 45; Sarra, “Rescue”, supra 
note 4 at 4. 
357 Himo & Mojtahedi, supra note 339 at 128; Consumers Packaging, supra note 335 at para 2; PCAS Patient Care 
Automation Services Inc (Re), 2012 ONSC 2778 (Commercial List)at paras 10–12 (court did not approve inclusion of 
certain fees because these were not approved in the monitor’s report). 
358 Himo & Mojtahedi, at 120, 122 (“the monitor’s main purpose has been to reassure the lenders of the impartiality 
of the process and to provide an objective assessment of the financial position of the debtor and management's efforts 
to restructure the business while a plan of arrangement is being developed… to ensure that the debtor stayed the course 
and did not use the CCAA for an improper purpose” ibid at 122). 
359 Essar, supra note 306 at para 109. 
360 Callidus, supra note 4 at para 52; CCAA, supra note 2, s 23(1)(i). 
361 Michelle Grant & Tevia R M Jeffries, “Having Jumped Off the Cliffs, When Liquidating Why Choose CCAA over 
Receivership (or vice versa)?”, in J Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2013 (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) 
[Retrieved from WestlawNext Canada]. 
362 See CCAA, supra note 2, at ss 23(1)(b)–(d). 





extending the courts’ presence beyond the courtroom, the monitor has become more involved in 
mediation and negotiation, actively stepping into its capacity as an expert with an increasing focus 
on advising and leading the process.364 
The careful crafting of the role over time has resulted in a wide range of duties and 
responsibilities. It has been remarked that “in the majority of cases, the monitor’s role and 
influence extends beyond that of watchdog.”365 Indeed, the broad authority conferred on the court  
by section 11 of the CCAA has led parties to request “an expansion of monitors’ powers to cover 
numerous types of duties in a variety of circumstances.”366 For instance, the information 
intermediary now also typically advises and makes recommendations based on that information, 
usually in the form of monitor’s reports.367 This advisory role consists of “providing business 
judgment, negotiation skills and financial advice.”368  
When a monitor is endowed with broader authority, it is referred to as a “super monitor,”369 
and its multifaceted role has been likened to trying to wear multiple hats, often at once.370 This is 
especially common in mid-market cases, where “the monitor usually has to be active for two major 
reasons: (1) the debtor may not have the management horsepower to direct a restructuring, and (2) 
 
364 Ibid. 
365 Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J Lubben, “Sales or Plans: A Comparative Account of the “New” Corporate 
Reorganization” (2011) 56 McGill LJ 591 at 603; See also Rotem, supra note 338 at 144–45; Jeffries, “Releases”, 
supra note 329. 
366 Jeffries, “Releases”, ibid. 
367 Kent et al, supra note 249 at 16. 
368 Sarra, “Ethics”, supra note 323 at 178. 
369 See e.g., Nortel Networks Corp (Re), 2015 ONSC 2987 (Commercial List) [Nortel] (“[i]n this case the Monitor is 
acting under what is now referred to as a “super monitor” order of October 3, 2012 in which the Monitor was 
authorized to exercise any powers which may be exercised by a board of directors” ibid at para 42). 
370 Winalta, supra note 10 at para 80; Sarra, “Ethics”, supra note 323 at 174; Anna Lund, Trustees at Work: Financial 
Pressures, Emotional Labour, and Canadian Bankruptcy Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019) 2 at 43 (Lund writes in 
the broader context of trustees, though what she says is directly applicable: “[t]rustees wear a number of different 





cost — the debtor cannot afford to pay financial advisors, legal counsel, and the monitor.”371 In 
the nearly five decades since the CCAA was revived,372 the matters and parties with which it was 
enacted to contend have grown far more complex.373 The monitor has increasingly been molded 
into an expanded version of its original watchdog role,374 as the expert called in to make sense of 
and guide the parties through these growing intricacies.375 It has an established—and 
respected376—status as independent expert, and its reports are not only viewed with credibility by 
the court but are often difficult to successfully challenge.377  
The monitor is not only the court’s appointed officer, it acts as a guide to the debtor, and 
safeguards the interests of creditors as a whole.378 One author states that “[i]n taking on the larger 
role of overseeing the restructuring process, monitors become advisors to the debtor company, but 
are also protectors of the creditors and other stakeholders, and finally, must be the “eyes and ears” 
 
371 Peter P Farkas, “Defining (and refining) the role of the Monitor” (2010) 72 CBR (5th) 159 [Retrieved from 
WestlawNext Canada]; See also Sarra, “Ethics”, supra note 323 at 184 (“[i]n small and mid-market workouts under 
the CCAA, the auditor is more likely to act as monitor because there are not sufficient assets remaining to pay for the 
costs of both” ibid). 
372 Alfonso Nocilla, “The History of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and the Future of Restructuring Law 
in Canada” (2014) 56:1 Can Bus LJ 73 at 74 [Nocilla, “History”] (“[r]esurrected in the 1980s, it [the CCAA] has 
gradually become Canada's statute of choice for resolving large, complex corporate insolvencies” ibid). 
373 John I McLean & David P Bowra, “Conflicts and the Modern CCAA Monitor” in J. Sarra, Annual Review of 
Insolvency Law 2011 (Toronto, Carswell, 2011) [Retrieved from WestlawNext Canada] (“[t]hey now often involve 
entities that operate in multiple jurisdictions, complex business structures and groups of companies or partnerships, 
and complex accounting and financial operations” ibid). 
374 Kent & Rostom, supra note 326 (“[i]n most CCAA cases the monitor plays a far broader role than watchdog, and 
indeed the watchdog role is largely irrelevant… [i]n practice, the monitor plays an expanded role” ibid); McLean & 
Bowra, supra note 373 (“[t]he emergence and use by the courts of “model orders” that contain additional duties has 
further enlarged the mandate of the monitor” ibid); Denis Ferland, “The Evolving Role of the Monitor, Confidential 
Information and the Monitor’s Cross-examination, a Québec Perspective”, in J Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency 
Law, 2011 (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) [Retrieved from WestlawNext Canada]. 
375 McLean & Bowra, ibid.  
376 Ibid; Tevia R M Jeffries, “Unsecured Creditors’ Committees in Canada and the United States: Does the Canadian 
Monitor Play a More Effective Role in Restructuring?”, in J Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2012 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2012) [Retrieved from WestlawNext Canada] [Jeffries “Unsecured”]. 
377 McLean & Bowra, ibid; Kent et al, supra note 249 at 16, Kent & Rostom, supra note 326; Jeffries, “Unsecured”, 
ibid; McLaren, supra note 8 ch 4 at para 4.1070 (McLaren discusses this difficulty in the context of a monitor’s 
decision-making power: “[w]here the monitor is bestowed the powers that allow it in anyway to render a decision, the 
burden of proof for refuting any of the monitors [sic] decisions rests on the party who substantially asserts the 
affirmative of the issue” McLaren, ibid).  
378 Marc S Wasserman et al, “Protecting Canadian Creditors: The Evolving Role of the Monitor in Cross-Border 





of the court, all at once.”379 It must carry out these responsibilities in accordance with 
impartiality,380 a duty to act in the best interests of all parties,381 a fiduciary duty,382 and an overall 
duty of good faith.383 The balancing required to juggle the monitor’s multiple roles and adhere to 
the above obligations can lead to actual and perceived conflicts of interest.384 
PART II – DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ROLE OF THE MONITOR 
The monitor’s role is burdened with the pressure to stay neutral, in the midst of multiple 
clashing interests, its growing responsibilities, and the persuasiveness of the parties. Describing 
the monitor’s uneasy role within the CCAA scheme, Knowles writes:  
Applying for protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act… is similar to 
a sick, but not terminally ill, patient going to the hospital emergency room… The Monitor 
is instrumental in assessing the treatment options and their application. However, where a 
Monitor takes on conflicting roles in a CCAA proceeding, he or she may wind up acting 
as both healthcare professional and undertaker, which raises the question of whether a 
Monitor can, in fact, successfully carry out these roles in tandem.385 
The most basic example of a seemingly inherent conflict in the monitor’s role is that it is expected 
to “provide an independent assessment of the business and financial affairs of the debtor that can 
be relied upon by the court and by the creditors,”386 while simultaneously acting as a guide to the 
debtor through the proceedings.387 The danger here is of helping the debtor to navigate the 
 
379 Ferland, supra note 374. 
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381 See e.g. Laidlaw Inc (Re) (2002), 34 CBR (4th) 72 (Ont SCJ [Commercial List]) at paras 2–3 [Laidlaw]. 
382 Winalta, supra note 10 at para 80 (“[a] monitor owes a fiduciary duty to the stakeholders; is required to account to 
the court; is to act independently; and must treat all parties reasonably and fairly, including creditors, the debtor and 
its shareholders” ibid at para 67).  
383 CCAA, supra note 2, s 18.6; See also Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 at paras 92–93 [Bhasin]. 
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proceedings without becoming or being perceived as its representative.388 This concern is explored 
below in further detail. 
(i) The Debtor & Monitor Relationship 
 As noted earlier, even prior to 1997, the monitor was commonly the debtor’s auditor. This 
practice was controversial because it is hard to contemplate a better example of perceived bias than 
a pre-existing relationship. The 1997 CCAA addition of section 11.7 recognized this conflict, 
stating that: 
11.7(2) Except with the permission of the court and on any conditions that the court may 
impose, no trustee may be appointed as monitor in relation to a company 
(a) if the trustee is or, at any time during the two preceding years, was… 
(iii) the auditor, accountant or legal counsel, or a partner or an employee of the auditor, 
accountant or legal counsel, of the company.389  
Curiously, the practice of courts is typically to accept the debtor’s auditor as monitor appointee,390 
usually with the justification that “[i]n many cases, the monitor also acts as financial advisor to the 
debtor, and this tends to make the CCAA process cheaper and faster.”391  
Cost savings is often heralded as the primary rationale for this practice,392 though potential 
pitfalls may be serious. For instance, the former auditor now monitor may be tasked with 
scrutinizing transactions that it participated in as advisor prior to the monitor appointment.393 
 
388 Ibid (“[t]he monitor or trustee must attempt to guide the debtor through the process without becoming an advocate 
or mouthpiece for the debtor” ibid); Winalta, supra note 10 (“[b]ias, whether perceived or actual, undermines the 
public's faith in the system… a CCAA monitor must act with professional neutrality, and scrupulously avoid placing 
itself in a position of potential or actual conflict of interest” ibid at para 82); Standing Senate Committee Report, supra 
note 229 at 185. 
389 Supra note 2. 
390 Farkas, supra note 371. 
391 JTF, supra note 235 at 52. 
392 Jeffries, “Unsecured”, supra note 376; See also Sarra, “Ethics”, supra note 323 (“[a]llowing auditors to act as 
monitors can arguably assist in reducing both premature and deferred liquidations by encouraging the debtor's 
directors and officers to file in a timely manner and determine whether there is a viable business plan” ibid at 185–
86); See e.g. Hickman Equipment (1985) Ltd (Re) (2002), 214 Nfld & PEIR 126 (TD) at paras 8, 23, 49 [Hickman]. 





Moreover, the timing of the initial order, under which the monitor is appointed,394  can work 
against creditors.395 Not only is it common that “most creditors are not in court at the time of the 
initial order,” but “courts now expect [that] a "proposed" monitor's report be filed at the time of 
the initial order.”396 This means that the debtor’s monitor appointee has already been working with 
the debtor,397 which raises concern of possible bias. It should be noted that although the CCAA is 
traditionally a debtor-driven process, the rising trend of creditor-driven CCAAs suggests that the 
concern over monitors being too pro-debtor may be somewhat downplayed.398 Creditor-driven 
CCAAs, however, raise their own concerns, wherein certain creditors and creditor groups—
typically stronger, secured creditors—may themselves be unfairly favoured by the monitor.399 
Looking back before the immediate proceedings, “the depth and duration”400 of the relationship 
may also strongly suggest a conflict that outweighs cost savings.401 This potential difficulty is not 
exclusive to one party, as conflict may stem from a “relationship or prior engagement(s) or 
involvement with an insolvent company, its creditors, shareholders, board of directors or other 
stakeholders.”402   
 
394 CCAA, supra note 2, s 11.7(1). 
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399 See Nocilla, “Asset Sales”, supra note 94 at 80; Tickle, ibid; DaRe & Nocilla, supra note 338 at 241, citing Sarra, 
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At the same time, an auditor’s familiarity with the debtor company is also considered one 
of the justifications for appointing it as the monitor.403 There are a variety of synergies potentially 
gained from appointing a debtor’s former auditor to the role of monitor. For example, “the auditor 
knows the corporation inside and out, has already established working relationships with 
management, and is cheaper to employ… [and] can also utilize his knowledge of the firm to 
formulate a restructuring.”404 Likewise, the monitor’s expertise is crucial,405 and when coupled 
with knowledge of and an existing relationship with the debtor, “it may be easier to overcome 
management’s concerns about filing.”406 The expanded “super monitor” is also a consideration 
here, as “if it is appropriate for the monitor in substance to act as financial advisor as well as a 
watchdog then the concern about the auditor being too close to the debtor’s management appears 
to be irrelevant.”407 Yet if the monitor is too close to the debtor’s management, it may find its view 
on restructuring options narrowed. Moreover, the flexibility of the monitor’s role “confuses the 
conflict analysis,” because debtor’s auditors have traditionally been considered unsuitable to act 
as receivers, a function which monitors may, in effect, fulfill in many cases.408 Additionally, 
expanding the duties of monitors—i.e., into super monitors—would necessarily magnify the 
potential for actual and perceived conflicts.409 Notwithstanding the foregoing pros and cons, it is 
generally accepted that so long as there is full and transparent disclosure of such past 
 
403 Rotem, supra note 338 at 149; Wood, “Bankruptcy”, supra note 8 at 389 (“[t]he auditor is generally the accounting 
professional who is most knowledgeable about the business affairs of the company and best able to assemble the 
financial information required in connection with the commencement of restructuring proceedings” ibid).  
404 Ben-Ishai & Lubben, supra note 365 at 603. 
405 Rotem, supra note 338 at 159 (“[n]otwithstanding the controversial selection of the firm's own auditor, appointing 
an accountant as Monitor will mean that the role is assumed by a professional with expertise in collecting and 
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relationships,410 and no “material objection from interested parties,”411 the court will approve the 
auditor as monitor. As this decision occurs at the outset of proceedings, it does not necessarily 
reflect changing attitudes as proceedings continue, and perceived bias(es) that may or may not 
arise.412 
(ii) The Monitor & the Sales Process 
 One of the more controversial practices that has emerged in the past few decades is the use 
of the CCAA to authorize sales of substantially all of the debtor’s assets.413 The monitor is at the 
center of these CCAA sales, as it is responsible for providing the court with a fairness and 
reasonableness opinion.414 Beyond this statutory obligation, the monitor typically plays an active 
role in the negotiations leading to the sale,415 and may have even proposed the sale.416 On one 
hand, the monitor’s involvement can benefit creditors because monitors “can use the threat of 
withholding their approval to negotiate with the debtor.”417 On the other hand, this can lead to 
private negotiations between debtor and monitor, which not only creates a perception of bias, but 
 
410 JTF, supra note 235 at 52. 
411 Kent & Rostom, supra note 326. 
412 As Sarra writes: “[o]ne issue is whether the efficiencies generated by the dual role, in terms of more timely 
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perception of bias” Sarra, “Ethics”, supra note 323 at 184; Dietrich and Prince voice a similar point: “[a] fundamental 
principle in Canada with respect to the appointment of a monitor and/or receiver is the balancing of efficiency and 
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and is not subject to undue influence from an insolvent company, its board or shareholders, creditors or other 
stakeholders” supra note 400.  
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415 Kent & Rostom, supra note 326. 
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“has the odd result that one of the key negotiating parties has no direct economic stake in the 
outcome of the case.”418 Further, the monitor is principally an information intermediary, which 
means that it will be required to be “on the one hand, an architect of the plan and of the meeting 
process, and on the other hand… [present] the merits of the plan and of the meeting process to 
approve it.”419 In any event, the monitor’s approval can all but ensure court approval of the sale.  
However, although the monitor’s analysis carries great weight with the court, its value also 
depends heavily on how independent the analysis is.420 
This is further compounded if a “dual-track process” is pursued, whereby a restructuring 
plan is formulated for a company under CCAA protection, while the debtor also solicits offers for 
its assets, all under the guidance of the monitor.421 This might produce a “diametric conflict,” given 
that the monitor would be  attempting to keep the business operating while also seeking to sell off 
its assets.422 On the other hand, in order to preserve going concern value pending a potential 
purchase of the debtor company, the monitor must ensure the business is operational.423 Otherwise, 
liquidation of the assets may result in piecemeal sales for lesser value.  In Nelson,424 the court 
ordered that the monitor be replaced because the monitor’s affiliate had served as a financial 
advisor to the debtor for two years prior to the CCAA proceedings.425  The affiliate had advised in 
the structuring of the proposed sale.  The court stated that the monitor had “been front row and 
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mining operation) [Mine Jeffrey]. 
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centre in the very sales process… and has engaged in negotiations on behalf of [the debtor] 
Nelson.”426 In this case. the court was careful to say that no actual conflict arose.427 The case is 
important, however, because it signals a high-bar for impartiality and the monitor’s independence. 
Indeed, the court in Winalta highlighted the need to avoid any perception of—and of course 
actual—bias, in order to safeguard public faith in the insolvency system.428 Nevertheless, the dual-
track process, and accompanying two-fold monitor role, is subject to the contexts of each 
individual case. Although it appears an inherent conflict, if the goal of the CCAA is maximizing 
value for creditors (and other stakeholders), then this dual role might be necessary.429 
Alternatively, “if the monitor is highly involved in developing a plan of arrangement or a 
reorganization strategy, the monitor may be viewed as an advocate for the plan and the perception 
of the monitor’s independence can be threatened.”430  
(iii) Multiple, Divergent Interests 
 One of the justifications for collective insolvency regimes like the CCAA is that they help 
to resolve a collective action problem.431 Thomas Jackson succinctly defines the collective action 
problem in the insolvency context: 
Each creditor, unless assured of the other's cooperation, has an incentive to take advantage 
of individual collection remedies, and to do so before the other creditor acts. Unless each 
creditor individually attempts to "beat out" the other, that creditor will fare worse than the 
other. Yet this race not only creates costs for the individual creditors… it is also likely to 
lead to a premature termination of a debtor's business, because each creditor will consider 
only that creditor's own advantage from racing, instead of the disadvantages imposed on 
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creditors collectively. Thus, each creditor must participate in collectively non-optimal 
"advantage-taking" simply to avoid being taken advantage of.432 
The CCAA is not exempt from this problem, and, as previously mentioned, the appointment of the 
monitor is intended to provide part of the legislative scheme’s solution to the collective action 
problem.433 Yet arguably when the monitor is thrown into the mix, an altogether new obstacle 
arises. 
Put simply, not only are debtors and creditors typically—though not always—at cross 
purposes, but creditors “are not a homogenous group.”434 How then is the monitor, with its 
accompanying baggage of duties and responsibilities, supposed to act in the best interests of all 
these parties?435 Ideally, the monitor is a neutral expert, appointed by the court because of its 
“expertise in collecting and processing financial and economic data.”436 It wields this expertise in 
protecting the expression of creditor democracy, by assessing a plan that a majority has voted for, 
and presenting its reasonableness to the court.437 This ideal may be muddied by the reality that the 
monitor cannot please all parties, and “on occasion, one or more stakeholders will disagree with 
the monitor's recommendation and will have complaints about the process, and perceive bias and 
other failings on the part of the monitor, even where there are none.”438 Given that perceived bias 
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is just as deadly as actual bias in this context,439 even the appearance of a monitor siding with or 
acting for one or more parties can be determinative.440 Though cases where monitors were found 
to have acted in conflict are few,441 the divergence of interests is nonetheless in constant tension 
with the monitor’s numerous duties. One direction that courts have taken—as will be discussed 
directly below—is to hold that a monitor’s neutrality is malleable. 
(iv) Malleable Neutrality 
In Winalta, a comprehensive judicial discussion of a monitor’s duties, the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench said that bias—whether perceived or actual—is to be avoided through the 
monitor’s exercise of its professional neutrality.442 The Ontario Superior Court permitted space for 
straying from strict neutrality in its 2017 decision in Urbancorp Cumberland 2 GP Inc, (Re),443 
stating that the monitor is a neutral party until or unless granted the kind of powers that necessitate 
advocating a particular position.444 As will be seen in the below cases, the court opined that 
neutrality may only be subverted in pursuing facilitation of the restructuring.445  The court in 
Urbancorp decided against allowing the monitor to pursue an action, because it did not find it to 
advance the restructuring purpose and served only to direct attention to a disagreement between 
creditor groups.446 The court explicitly stressed that, while “[c]reditors are free to spend their 
money and face the consequences,” the monitor “acts with the imprimatur the Court… [and] is far 
more constrained.”447 
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In 2017, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ernst & Young Inc v Essar Global Fund Limited,448 
explained that a monitor is neutral and only takes positions “in support of a restructuring 
purpose.”449 The court observed that a CCAA trial judge’s supervision of the monitor is enough to 
safeguard against biased or otherwise unfair conduct.450 The court in Essar did not specifically 
address the lower court’s statement that “[w]hile it is the case that normally a Monitor, as an officer 
of the court, is to be neutral in its role and not take sides in favour of one stakeholder against 
another, there are exceptions.”451 The lower court was referring specifically to section 23(1)(k),452 
which as previously noted,453 grants courts the broad discretion to give the monitor additional 
powers. In Essar, the appellate court looked instead at section 23(1)(c),454 which the court noted 
is likely to “frequently place a monitor at odds with the shareholders or other stakeholders.”455 
Both courts seem to arrive at the same place, which coincides with Urbancorp: a monitor is neutral 
unless a court decides it may sidestep neutrality to help the restructuring along. 
 The Quebec Court of Appeal provides the most recent decision on monitor neutrality, in 
the context of a contest over whether the monitor in question could be given the power to pursue 
an action in the name of creditors.456 In that case, as in Essar, the court defended a monitor’s ability 
to take a position on the basis of section 23(1)(c).457 However, the court went further than both the 
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lower and appellate court in the Ontario cases, stating that: “[a]s long as the monitor is objective 
and not biased and takes positions based on reasoned criteria to further legitimate CCAA purposes, 
it now appears inescapable that the neutrality it must maintain is attenuated.”458 Thus, Aquadis 
provides a firm summary of the common theme in these cases, that the court decides if and when 
the monitor may “drop its cloak of neutrality.”459 If neutrality is malleable, what does this say of 
the monitor’s strongest duty, that of a fiduciary for all parties involved?  
(v) Fiduciary Duty 
 At the heart of the role is its fiduciary duty. It is the most important duty, because it cements 
the understanding of the monitor as being ‘one for all’: the eyes and ears of the court.460 Although 
crucial, “[a]n under-explored aspect of the conflicts issue is precisely to whom the fiduciary 
obligation of monitors is owed.”461 In an early case, prior to the 1997 codification of the role, the 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal maintained that the monitor owes a fiduciary duty to all parties.462 
In the 2002 case of Re Hickman Equipment (1985) Ltd,463 the court considered the monitor’s role 
as being similar to a receiver, and thus a receiver’s fiduciary duty formed the standard for the 
monitor’s own.464 The Alberta Queen’s Bench made the same comparison in Re 843504,465 where 
it clarified that the court-appointed officer “owes a duty to treat all creditors reasonably and fairly,” 
and,  “[l]ike a court-appointed receiver or liquidator, its duties are those of a fiduciary.”466 This 
comparison is not without merit, because as mentioned previously, a court-appointed receiver—
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as opposed to a privately appointed receiver—is a court officer “and acts in a fiduciary capacity in 
relation to all parties who have an interest in the assets under receivership.”467 Yet the monitor 
functions as a much further extension of the court’s supervisory capacity, and thus “serves a 
broader statutory objective.”468  
In 2002, the Ontario Superior Court in Laidlaw stated that the monitor “must objectively 
look out for and be concerned for the interests of all stakeholders… but looked at in a reasonable 
way… there must be an air of reality to the analysis.”469 The court in Laidlaw did not clarify what 
constitutes an air of reality, nor did it provide guidance for this suggested analysis. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal set out limits for the monitor’s fiduciary duty in the 2006 case of Ivaco Inc (Re).470 
In Ivaco, the court refused to recognize a fiduciary duty owed to pension beneficiaries, arguing 
that the monitor’s powers, though expanded beyond those in section 11.7(3),471 did not rise to the 
level of equating its duty to the fiduciary duty owed by the relevant companies.472 The Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Essar cited Ivaco for the proposition that “a monitor is not necessarily a 
fiduciary; it only becomes one if the court specifically assigns it a responsibility to which fiduciary 
duties attach.”473 
In the 2011 seminal case on a monitor’s fiduciary duty, Winalta  ̧ the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench did not consider limitations when laying out the essentials of the duty. The court 
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stated that the monitor’s fiduciary duty is owed to the stakeholders,474 and is paramount to 
maintaining “the public's confidence in the insolvency system.”475 In that case, the monitor was 
accused of favouring one creditor over others, providing it with a report not disclosed to other 
creditors.476 The court offered clarification about monitors that wear multiple hats, stating “there 
may be heightened sensitivity about the work of a CCAA monitor who has chosen to wear two 
hats… due to an honestly held suspicion about where the monitor's loyalties lie rather than out of 
spite or malice.”477 The court’s suggestion was that monitors should always operate with 
transparency, eliminating “[s]ecrecy [which] breeds suspicion.”478 The court in Nelson followed 
Winalta, stressing that “[i]t is critical that in this role a monitor be independent of the parties and 
be seen to be independent.”479 
As may be evident from the foregoing, there is some discrepancy with regards to the 
understanding of the monitor’s fiduciary duty. Is a fiduciary duty owed to all parties, or only in 
respect of the parties with whom the monitor is engaging? Does the monitor always owe fiduciary 
duties to the stakeholders in a restructuring, or do the monitor’s fiduciary duties only arise when 
the court grants powers to the monitor that by their nature attract fiduciary obligations? Given the 
immense responsibility that a fiduciary duty typically carries, it seems odd that some decisions 
ascribe it to monitors automatically, while other decisions only do so depending on the 
circumstances. Similarly, the evolution, or devolution, of the duty is strange, where pre-1997 cases 
recognized a duty to all parties and recent cases restrict its application. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has yet to clarify the monitor’s fiduciary duty, so the latest pronouncement is the Ontario 
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Court of Appeal’s limited view of the duty in Essar. This issue begs clarification, for if the 
monitor’s neutrality is malleable, can it be said that a monitor is truly independent? This question 
will be further explored in Chapter Three. 
PART III – EVALUATING EXISTING CHECKS & BALANCES 
While the above concerns are not without merit, “the overwhelming evidence from the case 
law is that monitors are highly ethical and skilled professionals; and there is no question that they 
have contributed significantly to the reputation of Canada’s restructuring regime.”480 The simplest 
assurance that one need not worry over the monitor’s impartiality is that it has no financial stake 
in whether there is a restructuring or liquidation, or any payment of claims.481 While monitors are 
paid for their services, their fee is a recognized payment under the Act, and does not typically 
attract concerns of bias.482 Notwithstanding this uncontroversial aspect of proceedings, monitors 
and their firms represent a business, one which looks to establish long-term relationships and a 
respectable client base.483 There is therefore the possibility that underlying these appointments is 
not only the history between the parties, but also the “the prospect or hope of future 
engagements.”484 
Monitors must also be trustees and licensed professionals,485 subject to a variety of ethical 
guidelines.486 For instance, monitors must adhere to the Canadian Association of Insolvency and 
Restructuring Professionals (CAIRP) Rules of Professional Conduct.487 The CAIRP rules 
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generally stipulate that insolvency professionals must remain objective, and are to dispel any 
influence or relationship which would tarnish that objectivity or give rise to a conflict of interest.488 
These rules are also presented as a minimum standard, meaning insolvency professionals are 
expected to go above and beyond these ethical guidelines in practice.489 Aside from these 
professional obligations, the monitor is also subject to a variety of  checks and balances within the 
CCAA regime, geared towards safeguarding independence.490 
One of the provisions in the Act that functions to protect the integrity of CCAA proceedings 
is section 18.6, which came into force in 2019.491 This is the duty of good faith, which applies to 
all ‘interested persons’492 in the proceedings, and is also an organizing principle at common law 
when entering into and performing contracts.493 Good faith generally requires a party to be “honest, 
candid, forthright or reasonable” in their contractual performance.494 When applied to the monitor, 
good faith promotes transparency, which is crucial for quelling any suspicions of bias/conflict.495 
Monitors are also subject to direct oversight by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, 
which is responsible for investigation of any complaints of monitor misconduct.496 
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Similarly, courts are given extensive powers of discretion over proceedings under section 
11 of the CCAA.497 While they typically limit themselves to a supervisory role,498 courts have the 
ability to use orders so as to proactively police the monitor (and other parties).499 These courts also 
tend to be highly specialized commercial lists,500 with substantial expertise in CCAA matters. This 
affords CCAA judges a unique role in protecting the process. 
Market forces also play a role in encouraging monitors to practice in an efficient and 
ethically professional manner.501 Those insolvency professionals with a reputation for impartiality 
and effective problem-solving skills will naturally be chosen over their less-favoured 
colleagues.502 Such monitors will balance a passive observer role with that of a more active 
adversarial role. The latter promotes “an adversarial environment in which information is brought 
to the forum” by multiple parties, because the monitor is constantly holding the debtor accountable 
for dealing with other parties to the process with transparency.503  
This transparency can be further promoted, in certain cases, by the appointment of a Chief 
Restructuring Officer (CRO). This is usually done in the initial order,504 which sets out that the 
CRO is “to steer the insolvent firm through the negotiation for a plan and the restructuring 
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process.”505 Depending on the circumstances, the CRO may assume some of the functions of the 
CEO or board of directors, otherwise it takes on enhanced senior management responsibilities.506 
The main advantage of the CRO is that it is typically a restructuring expert, and it brings a fresh 
perspective into proceedings.507 Additionally, as a court-appointed officer, the CRO is subject to 
direct judicial supervision, as opposed to internal accountability measures typical between a 
debtor’s board of directors and management.508 However, many of the same issues already 
discussed which plague the monitor also affect the CRO, namely bias and an unclear fiduciary 
duty.509 The CRO is also not required to be a licensed professional, nor is it subject to oversight 
by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.510 CRO fees can also be performance-driven, 
which can cause it to favour some stakeholders’ interests to the exclusion of others, potentially 
creating a perception of bias.511 All of this is to say, while a CRO may be appropriate and a great 
boon in some cases, it is not without its own imperfections, some of which may outweigh its 
positive effects. 
PART IV - CONCLUSION 
 The monitor is a key component of the CCAA restructuring regime. Its role as agent of the 
court, combined with its expertise, make it an important leadership figure for all stakeholders, and 
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a guide for the debtor and the court. The monitor is involved at the initial order, in the planning 
and negotiating of the restructuring, and finally at the court approval stage. It steers the debtor 
through the complexities of proceedings, and ensures that stakeholders are adequately informed. 
However, these functions and responsibilities may spread the monitor thin, particularly as regards 
its independence and ethics.512 The monitor’s neutrality and fiduciary duty are not entirely clear. 
Likewise, while there is a code of ethics the monitor must follow, and a requirement that it proceed 
in good faith, the nature of the CCAA process still allows room for bias. A monitor caught up in a 
two-track process is but one example. Arguably, the ethical framework of an insolvency 
professional serving as monitor would be strengthened by a clearly defined legal duty 
encompassing CAIRP guidelines and best business practices. The underexplored source of the 
monitor’s impartiality needs a closer examination and reformulation. Both goals are discussed in 
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 In common law systems, individuals who are vested with the power to act on behalf of 
others are obligated under law to act with the highest integrity and selflessness. Where this 
relationship requires extensive responsibilities,513 those vested therewith are called fiduciaries, of 
which one of the most underexplored examples is the monitor under the CCAA.514 The monitor 
owes a fiduciary duty to all parties involved in a CCAA case,515 and yet its current role sometimes 
necessitates that it deviate from the strict requirement of neutrality.516 This curious practice may 
have the ill effect that the monitor favours some parties over others, constituting a significant 
departure from the strict impartiality supposedly imposed by fiduciary obligations.  
This Chapter proposes changes to the monitor’s role, that are intended to maximize its 
utility while respecting its duties as a fiduciary. This necessarily requires consideration of fiduciary 
law first principles, as well as the question of whether the monitor can effectively perform the 
duties of a fiduciary. Accordingly, Part I of this Chapter examines the law of fiduciary duties in 
Canada. Next follows a brief synthesis of how a monitor’s fiduciary duty is currently understood 
by Canadian courts and commentators. Then, in Part II, I will examine the fiduciary duties of the 
court-appointed receiver and Canadian directors and officers, focusing on their similarities in 
balancing the interests of various parties. A further comparison will be made by examining the 
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Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, itself a fiduciary in the American counterpart to the CCAA: 
Chapter 11.517 Once these comparisons are made, I will present suggested solutions to monitor 
conflict of interest in Part III. I will argue in Part IV that the monitor owes a fiduciary duty to the 
CCAA process, beholden to the CCAA’s multiple objectives. My proposal is for codification of 
this duty within the CCAA, such that the monitor would owe a duty to the process, abiding by the 
standard of fairness and the pursuit of CCAA objectives, in the best interests of the stakeholder 
collective. I will conclude in Part V with some comments about the need to ensure that the role of 
the monitor is properly reconfigured so as to effectively and proactively avoid conflicts of interest, 
while serving all parties to a CCAA proceeding impartially and fairly. 
PART I – FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE 
 The definition of a fiduciary in Canada is imprecise.518 In simple terms, “where one party 
has placed its ‘trust and confidence’ in another and the latter has accepted—expressly or by 
operation of law—to act in a manner consistent with the reposing of such ‘trust and confidence,’ 
a fiduciary relationship has been established.”519 While a fiduciary stands in a position of trust—
sometimes referred to as a trustee—and the duty flows from a beneficiary, these terms merely 
reflect the roots of fiduciary law (i.e., in trust law), and do not necessitate the presence of a formal 
trust.520 The fiduciary is held to the highest standards regarding its conduct with respect to the 
beneficiary. It owes a duty “of utmost good faith (uberminae fides), which itself imports a 
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requirement that the fiduciary act towards the beneficiary with a heightened sense of loyalty and 
fidelity.”521 The mechanics of a fiduciary duty are as follows:  
one should think of the fiduciary relationship as a transfer of powers from the beneficiary, 
B, to the fiduciary, F. The powers transferred by B to F originally belonged to the former 
and, in fact, still do. B has merely loaned the powers to F within the ambit of their fiduciary 
relationship; they do not become F's own possession. F is duty-bound to use these powers 
in the same manner as B would, subject to any constraints B imposes on their use. F may 
not exceed these imposed limits or else [may] be liable for breach of duty; the purpose of 
F's duty is to act within the parameters established by B through the latter's transfer of 
powers, [and] not exceed them.522  
Before such requirements are imposed, a fiduciary obligation must be found, which is not a 
straightforward analysis.523 In Guerin v R,524 the Supreme Court of Canada explained that 
identifying a fiduciary relationship depends on “the nature of the relationship, not the specific 
category of actor involved.”525 The Court then went on to set out three useful considerations for 
determining the existence of a fiduciary relation in Frame v Smith,526 which it adopted in 
International Corona Resources Ltd v Lac Minerals Ltd:527 
Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation have been imposed seem to possess three 
general characteristics: (1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or 
power. (2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect 
the beneficiary's legal or practical interests. (3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to 
or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.528 
The analysis begins with the facts of the particular relationship being examined in each case,529 as 
opposed to rigidly applying pre-existing categories of fiduciary duty.530 Such categories serve as 
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considered closed” ibid). 
526 [1987] 2 SCR 99, Wilson J, dissenting [Frame]. 
527 Lac Minerals, supra note 518. 
528 Frame, supra note 526. 
529 Lac Minerals, supra note 518 (“the existence of a fiduciary obligation can be said to be a question of fact to be 
determined by examining the specific facts and circumstances surrounding each relationship” ibid).  





guides but are not the only places where a fiduciary obligation may be found.531 Two decades after 
Lac Minerals, the Court grappled with the still lingering difficulties surrounding the determination 
of a fiduciary duty in Galambos v Perez,532 and Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society.533 
 Galambos dealt with whether vulnerability of the beneficiary —i.e., the third characteristic 
in the Frame/Lac Minerals analysis—is determinative of a fiduciary obligation. In that case, the 
Court stated that “to assert that the protection of the vulnerable is the role of fiduciary law puts the 
matter too broadly.”534 Instead, the proper analysis is to look at “the position of the parties that 
results from the relationship which gives rise to the fiduciary duty [rather] than with the respective 
positions of the parties before they enter into the relationship.”535 Moreover, the Court clarified 
the concept of existing categories of fiduciary relationships, which it referred to as per se fiduciary 
relationships. These “are considered to give rise to fiduciary obligations because of their inherent 
purpose or their presumed factual or legal incidents.”536 Importantly, the Court noted that in some 
instances, such as in a solicitor-client relationship, “not every legal claim…will give rise to a claim 
for a breach of fiduciary duty.”537 The difficulty in such cases lies in discerning which 
responsibilities flow from the fiduciary relationship and which do not.538 
 
531 Guerin, ibid; Lac Minerals, ibid. 
532 2009 SCC 48 [Galambos]. 
533 Elder Advocates, supra note 513. 
534 Galambos, supra note 532 at para 67; See also Rotman, supra note 518 at 67 (“[t]he fiduciary relationship creates 
vulnerability; vulnerability does not create the fiduciary relationship” ibid). 
535 Ibid at para 68, citing Hodgkinson, supra note 518 at 406. 
536 Galambos, ibid at para 36, citing Lac Minerals, supra note 518. 
537 Galambos, ibid. 
538 Ibid at para 37, citing Lac Minerals, supra note 518 (“[a] claim for breach of fiduciary duty may only be founded 
on breaches of the specific obligations imposed because the relationship is one characterized as fiduciary…not all 





In order to have a fiduciary obligation, there must be “an undertaking of loyalty,”539 and 
discretionary power to affect the beneficiary’s interests.540 The undertaking of loyalty concerns 
acting in the best interests of the beneficiary,541 while the beneficiary’s interests are defined as any 
“legal or vital practical interests.”542  Both these requirements are restatements of the Frame/Lac 
Minerals characteristics, i.e., scope for discretion of power by the fiduciary and the ability 
therewith to affect the beneficiary. The Supreme Court also noted that fiduciary obligations will 
only be found where the fiduciary is found to “have expressly or impliedly undertaken them.”543 
Importantly, in determining whether there has been an implied undertaking, the Court says it will 
consider “professional norms, industry or other common practices and whether the alleged 
fiduciary induced the other party into relying on the fiduciary's loyalty.”544 Like the undertaking, 
the discretionary power is also to be scrutinized if it involves the giving of advice, which “will not 
necessarily on its own support the existence of an ad hoc fiduciary duty; its absence, however, 
negates the existence of such a duty.”545 
 In Elder Advocates, the Court reaffirmed its position on the insufficiency of vulnerability 
as a determinative factor of fiduciary obligations.546 It further classified the Frame/Lac Minerals 
characteristics as “hallmarks,”547 and restated that “the evidence must show that the alleged 
 
539 Galambos, ibid at para 69, citing Hodgkinson, supra note 518 at 404–07; Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 226 
(“fiduciary relationships... are always dependent on the fiduciary's undertaking to act in the beneficiary's interests” 
Norberg, ibid at 273). 
540 Galambos, ibid at paras 70, 83 (note that this combines the first two characteristics listed in Frame/Lac Minerals); 
See also Norberg, ibid at 275 (such power is necessary for a fiduciary to carry out its role). 
541 Galambos, ibid at para 66; Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, supra note 513 ch 1 at 3, citing Regal (Hastings) Ltd v 
Gulliver, [1942] 1 All ER 378 (HL) at 381 [Gulliver] (“[t]he law requires the fiduciary to act in a manner consistent 
with the best interests of the beneficiary in all matters related to the undertaking of trust and confidence” Ellis, 
Fairbairn & McKendry, ibid). 
542 Galambos, ibid at para 70. 
543 Ibid at paras 71, 77. 
544 Galambos, supra note 532 at para 79. 
545 Ibid at para 84, citing Hodgkinson, supra note 518, Lac Minerals, supra note 518. 
546 Elder Advocates, supra note 513 at para 28. 
547 Ibid at para 29 (“[a]s useful as the three "hallmarks" referred to in Frame are in explaining the source fiduciary 





fiduciary gave an undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of a beneficiary.”548 
Expounding on the meaning of a beneficiary’s interests, the Court stated that these may range from 
property interests to other legally recognized interests.549 For instances falling outside of the 
recognized categories of fiduciary relations, the Court provided the following framework:  
for an ad hoc fiduciary duty to arise, the claimant must show, in addition to the vulnerability 
arising from the relationship as described by Wilson J. in Frame; (1) an undertaking by the 
alleged fiduciary to act in the best interests of the alleged beneficiary or beneficiaries; (2) 
a defined person or class of persons vulnerable to a fiduciary's control (the beneficiary or 
beneficiaries); and (3) a legal or substantial practical interest of the beneficiary or 
beneficiaries that stands to be adversely affected by the alleged fiduciary's exercise of 
discretion or control.550 
The above is a synthesis of the Frame/Lac Minerals characteristics and their restatement in 
Galambos. “Vulnerability” points to the discretionary power and its potential to impact the 
beneficiary. The essential element of an undertaking—mentioned in Norberg, Hodgkinson, and 
Galambos551—is defined alongside clarification as to whom it is given, and the need for it to affect 
such parties’ interests. Finally, the Court is careful to underscore vulnerability as a result, stating 
that the effect of the fiduciary’s actions must have the possibility of affecting the beneficiary 
negatively. This is the reason typically cited for invoking equity to protect the beneficiary.552 
 Fiduciary obligations thus function to protect beneficiaries by imposing a high standard on 
fiduciaries as regards their responsibilities.553 Recall that a fiduciary must act with the 
 
548 Ibid at para 30, citing Galambos, supra note 532 at paras 66, 71, 77–78, Hodgkinson, supra note 518 at 409–10. 
549 Ibid at para 35 (the Court also noted that “[i]n the traditional categories of fiduciary relationship, the nature of the 
relationship itself defines the interest at stake… [whereas] a party seeking to establish an ad hoc duty must be able to 
point to an identifiable legal or vital practical interest that is at stake” ibid). 
550 Ibid at para 36. 
551 See supra note 539 and accompanying text. 
552 See e.g., Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, supra note 513 ch 1 at 3; Lac Minerals, supra note 518; Rotman, supra note 
518 at 91 (“[i]t is precisely because fiduciary relationships create vulnerability in beneficiaries, rather than vice-versa, 
that fiduciary doctrine seeks to protect beneficiaries through the imposition of its harsh sanctions” ibid). 






beneficiary’s best interests in mind, and any departure from this is a breach of the duty.554 Under 
this reasoning, fiduciaries must not only avoid actual but possible conflicts of interest.555 This can 
be especially complicated when it comes to certain professions, particularly where fiduciaries may 
act without a full understanding of their legal obligations to beneficiaries.556 
PART II – COMPARING DIFFERENT TYPES OF FIDUCIARIES 
 Professionals engaged in providing financial advice, (e.g. accountants and investment 
counselors),557 are examples of occupations, that courts tend to consider as involving ad hoc 
fiduciary relationships.558 This is a result of  the advisory nature of the relationship between the 
professional and their clients/beneficiaries, wherein they use their special knowledge/skills to steer 
their clients towards a particular course of action.559 The consequences of misdirection via faulty 
or misguided advice or actions by such fiduciaries therefore directly impacts the beneficiaries’ 
financial interests. The Supreme Court of Canada in Hodgkinson stressed the importance of a 
factual analysis in determining when these types of occupations trigger fiduciary obligations: 
“where a fiduciary duty is claimed in the context of a financial advisory relationship, it is at all 
 
554 Ibid ch 1 at 3, citing Gulliver, supra note 541 at 381 (“[i]t is the fact of a departure from adherence to the 
beneficiary’s best interests, rather than an evaluation of the fiduciary’s motive in the departure, that constitutes a 
breach of fiduciary duty” Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, ibid). 
555 Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, ibid ch 1 at 4 (“[e]ntering into a potential conflict of interest is a breach whether or 
not the conflict is operative; once such a conflict becomes operative to jeopardize the beneficiary or his property, the 
fiduciary breach would then give rise to the remedies available in law… to wait until damage or prejudice actually 
occurs is to prejudice the beneficiary’s right to utmost loyalty and avoidance of conflict” ibid). 
556 Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, supra note 513 ch 1 at 19 (“[e]ven more problematic is the degree to which those 
who unquestionably act in a fiduciary capacity—corporate officers, directors and employees; joint venturers and 
partners; agents; trustees; lawyers, medical practitioners and accountants; elected officials; real estate and insurance 
brokers and agents; family members; and priests; to name but a few—are rarely even aware that they owe an extremely 
high degree of utmost good faith, loyalty and fidelity to those who have placed a fiduciary trust in them” ibid). 
557 Hodgkinson, supra note 518 (“whether the advisers be accountants, stockbrokers, bankers, or investment 
counsellors” ibid). 
558 Ibid. 
559 Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, supra note 513 ch 8 at 18.4–18.5, citing Elderkin v Merril Lynch Royal Securities 
Ltd (1977), 80 DLR (3d) 313 (NSCA), Burke v Cory (1959), 19 DLR (2d) 252 (Ont CA) at 258–59, Burns v Kelly 





events a question of fact as to whether the parties' relationship was such as to give rise to a fiduciary 
duty on the part of the advisor.”560 
(i) Fiduciary Duty of Receivers 
 Another example of such an occupation, within the context of insolvency law, is that of the 
receiver.561 Privately appointed receivers act as agents of their appointees, (most often a secured 
creditor), to whom they owe a fiduciary duty,562 though they “may be regarded as acting in an 
independent capacity in much the same way as a court-appointed receiver when enforcing the 
security interest.”563 As opposed to a privately appointed receiver,564 “[a] court-appointed receiver 
is an officer of the court and acts in a fiduciary capacity in relation to all parties who have an 
interest in the assets under receivership.”565 The court-appointed receiver, like the CCAA monitor, 
may also encounter challenges in carrying out its duty to the parties, whose  interests typically 
conflict.566 Interestingly, the receiver’s fiduciary obligation and impartiality are malleable,567 such 
that “despite a fiduciary duty owed universally to all parties to a receivership, the court-appointed 
receiver will not be hampered in the carrying out of his responsibilities under his appointment.”568 
 
560 Hodgkinson, supra note 518. 
561 Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, supra note 513 ch 11 at 1 (“[a]lmost without exception, the law will find these 
individuals to owe a fiduciary duty” ibid). 
562 Wood, “Bankruptcy”, supra note 8 at 507 (“[t]he privately appointed receiver’s duties were owed primarily to the 
secured creditor who appointed the receiver, although the receiver also owed a more limited duty to the debtor and 
to persons holding lower-ranking interests in the assets to act in good faith and to obtain the best price reasonably 
obtainable” ibid, citing Ostrander, supra note 319, Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corp Ltd, [1993] AC 295. 
563 Wood, “Bankruptcy”, supra note 8 at 498 – 99, citing Peat Marwick Ltd v Consumers’ Gas Co (1980), 29 OR 
(2d) 336 (CA).. 
564 Court-appointed receivers have a broader fiduciary obligation than their privately-appointed counterparts; See e.g., 
ibid ch 11 at 2; Wood, “Bankruptcy”, supra note 8 at 494–95, 507. 
565 Wood, ibid at 507, citing Re Newdigate, supra note 319, Ostrander, supra note 319; See also Ellis, Fairbairn & 
McKendry, supra note 513 ch 11 at 2.1, citing Parsons v Sovereign Bank of Canada, [1913] AC 160 (PC), Delzotto v 
International Chemalloy Corp (1977), 14 OR (2d) 72 (HC). 
566 Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, supra note 513 ch 11 at 1 (“[a]s might be expected in the throes of a receivership or 
a bankruptcy, respective interests of the interested parties conflict in the extreme” ibid). 
567 This is because the receiver exercises control over the debtor’s assets, displacing directors’ control; See BIA, 
supra note 241, s 246(1); See also Wood, “Bankruptcy”, supra note 8 at 500, 508. 
568 Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, supra note 513 ch 11 at 2.1–2.2, citing R v World Masters Sport Foundation, [1986] 





In this respect, the receiver and the monitor share common ground,569 yet it is unclear exactly what 
this means in the face of conflicting parties, obligations, and what is supposed to be a strict standard 
in fiduciary doctrine. A different approach has been taken by courts in interpreting the fiduciary 
duties of directors and officers when faced with diverging interests. 
(ii) Fiduciary Duty of Directors & Officers 
 Directors and officers of Canadian companies are under fiduciary obligations, to be carried 
out “with a view to the best interests of the corporation.”570 Much like the receiver and monitor, 
the duty is not owed to any party in particular, but rather to the collective that is the 
“corporation”.571 As Neumueller puts it, “[t]he objective of the fiduciary duty is to deter directors 
[and officers] from putting their own interests before those of the corporation… [they are] obliged 
by their fiduciary duty to act in good faith.”572 Referring to the Canada Business Corporations 
Act,  (CBCA), the Supreme Court of Canada summarized the essential components of the duty in 
Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise:573 
The statutory fiduciary duty requires directors and officers to act honestly and in good faith 
vis-à-vis the corporation.  They must respect the trust and confidence that have been 
reposed in them to manage the assets of the corporation in pursuit of the realization of the 
objects of the corporation.  They must avoid conflicts of interest with the 
corporation.  They must avoid abusing their position to gain personal benefit.  They must 
maintain the confidentiality of information they acquire by virtue of their 
position.  Directors and officers must serve the corporation selflessly, honestly and 
loyally.574 
The various groups and individuals that make up a corporation do not always share similar 
interests, particularly when it faces insolvency. In this respect, directors and officers are expected 
 
569 See Aquadis, supra note 437 at para 73; Essar, supra note 306 at para 117; Urbancorp, supra note 443 at para 22. 
570 See e.g., Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC, 1985 c C-44, s 122(1)(a) [CBCA]; Business Corporations Act, 
RSO 1990, c B.16, s 134(1)(a) [OBCA]. 
571 Carina Neumueller. “A Canadian Solution: Recent Developments in the Law of Directors' Duties in the Context of 
Financially Distressed Corporations” (2005) 14 Dal J Leg Stud 90 at 92. 
572 Ibid. 
573 2004 SCC 68 [Peoples]. 
574 Ibid at para 35 (note the various elements of fiduciary doctrine mentioned by the Court, i.e., honesty, good faith, 





to always maintain their duty to the corporation.575 The Supreme Court of Canada has specifically 
noted that when the interests of the stakeholders making up the corporation clash, “[w]here the 
conflict involves the interests of the corporation, it falls to the directors [and officers] of the 
corporation to resolve them in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of 
the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.”576 So long as directors and officers have 
treated stakeholders fairly, acted in good faith, and considered all relevant factors, they have 
upheld their fiduciary obligation to the corporation.577 This analysis provides an interesting parallel 
to the monitor’s fiduciary duty, given the similarities in balancing multiple conflicting interests. If 
directors and officers are acting for a broader purpose, vis-à-vis the best interests of the corporation 
over those of individual stakeholders, perhaps the monitor’s fiduciary duty can be better 
understood by framing it in similar terms.  
The problem with this is that monitors owe their fiduciary duty to all stakeholders, and not 
to the best interests of—albeit a legal “person”578—an inanimate entity. The group of creditors and 
stakeholders that hold claims in an insolvency situation are often referred to as the collective. 
Perhaps the monitor’s duty to this collective is not so different from the fiduciary duty of directors 
and officers. Can a monitor’s duty then be more clearly defined if it is said to be in the interests of 
a collective of stakeholders? Does this allow it to consider but not necessarily act in the best 
interests of individual stakeholders? I will return to this comparison in my reform proposal, as it 
 
575 Ibid at paras 43, 46 (“[t]he various shifts in interests that naturally occur as a corporation’s fortunes rise and fall do 
not, however, affect the content of the fiduciary duty… [t]he interests of the corporation are not to be confused with 
the interests of the creditors or those of any other stakeholders” ibid at para 43).  
576 BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69. at para 81 [1976 Debentureholders]. 
577 Ibid at para 82 (“[d]irectors [and officers] may find themselves in a situation where it is impossible to please all 
stakeholders” ibid at para 83). 





may provide an effective alternative for perceiving the duty despite the differences between the 
two. 
(iii) Fiduciary Duty of the Monitor 
 Like the court-appointed receiver, the monitor’s impartiality is not definite. Rather, it may 
“drop its cloak of neutrality,”579 if that is required in order to pursue CCAA objectives.580 While 
the monitor was considered a fiduciary even before the role was codified in the 1997 CCAA 
amendments,581 there are some cases that question whether this is an automatic attribute.582 In the 
seminal case on a monitor’s fiduciary duty, Winalta,583 the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench stated 
that monitors owe a fiduciary duty to all stakeholders,584 which duty acts as a bulwark for public 
confidence in the Canadian insolvency system.585 This follows the line of cases that consider the 
monitor a fiduciary from the outset.586 Yet the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ivaco and then in Essar 
held that a monitor only becomes a fiduciary if it is assigned a particular responsibility that requires 
the imposition of fiduciary obligations.587 This echoes the analysis in Lac Minerals588 and 
Galambos,589 whereby not all of a—in that case a per se—fiduciary’s responsibilities to 
beneficiaries are fiduciary in nature,590 and claims for breach of fiduciary duty must be founded 
on those responsibilities which impose fiduciary obligations.591 In other words, fiduciaries carry 
 
579 Urbancorp, supra note 443 at para 22. 
580 Aquadis, supra note 437 at para 73; Essar, supra note 306 at para 117. 
581 See 1997 Act, supra note 322; See e.g., Siscoe, supra note 336 at 9. 
582 See Essar, supra note 306; Ivaco, supra note 470. 
583 Supra note 10. 
584 Ibid at para 67. 
585 Ibid at para 73. 
586 See e.g., Nelson, supra note 315 at para 35; Winalta, supra note 10 at para 67; Re 843504, supra note 423 at para 
19 [Re 843504]; Siscoe, supra note 336 at 9. 
587 Essar, supra note 306 at para 119, citing Ivaco, supra note 470at paras 49–53; Re 1231640, supra note 473 at para 
51. 
588 Supra note 518. 
589 Supra note 532 at paras 36–37, citing Lac Minerals, ibid. 
590 Galambos, ibid at para 36. 





out duties that attract fiduciary standards of behaviour, along with other, more banal 
responsibilities. Yet this distinction only applies if it is first determined that a monitor is a 
fiduciary. The above cases suggest that this is not necessarily always so.  
One important question to ask is whether court-appointed officers are inherent or per se 
fiduciaries. Previously, we observed that courts have consistently stated that court-appointed 
receivers “must act fairly and honestly as a fiduciary on behalf of all parties with an interest in the 
debtor's property and undertaking.”592 Indeed, it seems to be a given that court-appointed receivers 
bear fiduciary obligations in each case.593 While receivers carry out slightly different functions,594 
and derive their powers mainly from a court order,595 their similarities with and judicial 
comparisons to the monitor make it difficult to understand why receivers are presumed fiduciaries 
and monitors’ fiduciary status appears questionable. After all, there is an ongoing debate over 
whether the CCAA monitor is essentially acting as a receiver in the increasing use of the CCAA 
to effect sales.596 There is another comparable fiduciary often confronted in the CCAA process—
specifically in cross-border proceedings—and that is Chapter 11’s Unsecured Creditors’ 
Committee (UCC).597 
 
592 Panamericana de Bienesy Servicios SA v Northern Badger Oil & Gas Ltd, 1991 ABCA 181. 
593 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v Isobord Enterprises Inc, 2002 MBCA 103 (“[i]t is trite to say that the 
receiver is an officer of the court and as a fiduciary acts for all parties”” ibid at para 17, citing Fotti v 777 Management 
Inc, [1981] 5 WWR 48 (Man QB) at 54). 
594 See Wood, “Bankruptcy”, supra note 8 at 497. 
595 Ibid (monitors powers stem from both statute and court orders; see CCAA, supra note 2 ss 23(1)(a)–(k)); See BIA, 
supra note 241, ss 46(2), 47(2), 47.1(2) (powers of receivers). 
596 See e.g. Urbancorp, supra note 443 at para 22; See also Alfonso Nocilla, “Reorganizations, Sales, and the Changing 
Face of Restructuring in Canada: Quantitative Outcomes of 2012 and 2013 CCAA Proceedings” (2019) 42:2 Dal LJ 
371 at 376 [Nocilla, “Reorganizations”]; Morin & Mojtahedi, supra note 398; Grant & Jeffries, supra note 361. 
597 Rachelle F Moncur & Rowena White, “The Hazards of Dual-Filed Reorganization Proceedings in Canada and the 





(iv) Fiduciary Duty of the UCC 
In Chapter 11, there is a requirement that an UCC be appointed in most cases.598 The UCC 
owes a fiduciary duty, limited to its constituent members,599 and not to the debtor or overall 
bankruptcy estate.600 The membership of the UCC is determined by the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Trustee,601 typically consists of the seven largest claims against the debtor,602 and may shift 
because creditors are able to bow out at any time.603 The UCC is given authority “both to promote 
and to protect the interests of its unsecured creditor constituency.”604 With this authority, the UCC 
is imbued with fiduciary obligations to its members, “defined by undivided loyalty and impartial 
service to all creditors represented… [and] bound not only to serving its co-creditors, but also to 
safeguarding the bankruptcy process.”605 The members of an UCC each owe fiduciary obligations 
to the committee’s constituents.606 These obligations are typically only owed to other members of 
a creditor’s class.607 Much like the monitor’s duty, even the appearance of a breach of fiduciary 
 
598 Code, supra note 112, s 1102(a)(1); See also Moncur & White, ibid (“[w]hile not mandatory in every case, a UCC 
is generally appointed in large Chapter 11 proceedings to act as an advocate of the debtor's prepetition unsecured 
creditors” Moncur & White, ibid at 401). 
599 Re Johns-Manville Corp, 23 BR 919 at 925 (Bankr SDNY, 1983) [Johns-Manville]. 
600 See e.g., Re SPM Manufacturing Corp, 984 F 2d 1305 (USCA 1st Cir 1993); Re Bohack Corp, 607 F (2d) 258 (2nd 
Cir, 1979) [Re Bohack]. 
601 Code, supra note 112, s 1102(a)(1). 
602 Ibid, s 1102(b)(1); See also Kenneth N Klee & K John Shaffer, “Creditors' Committees under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code” (1993) 44:4 SCL Rev 995 at 1006–09 (“the courts and U.S. Trustees routinely adjust the size of 
creditors' committees” ibid at 1006). 
603 Code, ibid, ss 1102(a)(2), 1102(a)(4). See also Michelle M Harner & Jamie Marincic, “Committee Capture - An 
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors' Committees in Business Reorganizations” (2011) 64:3 Vand L Rev 747 
at 754 (“turnover of committee membership can cause instability and potentially expose the committee to further 
manipulation by other creditors” ibid); See also Jason Harris, “Enhancing the Role of Creditors’ Committees in 
Corporate Rescue Laws”, in J Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2011 (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) [Retrieved 
from WestlawNext Canada]. 
604 Klee & Shaffer, supra note 602 at 1000; Code, supra note 112, s 1103(c). 
605 Mark D Gensburg, “Rogue Committees Or Rogue Judges: The Limits of a Bankruptcy Judge’s Authority to 
Disband Chapter 11 Committees” (2019) 35:2 Emory Bankr Dev J 601 at 609, citing In re Fas Mart Convenience 
Stores, Inc, 265 BR 427 at 432 (Bankr ED Va 2001) [Fas Mart]; Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc v Walsh, 
327 BR 561 at 573 (WD Pa 2005). 
606 Klee & Shaffer, supra note 602 at 1053, citing In re Map Int'l, Inc, 105 BR 5 at 6 (Bankr ED Pa 1989), In re 
National Equip & Mold Corp, 33 BR 574 (Bankr ND Ohio 1983). 
607 Klee & Shaffer, ibid at 1054 (see ibid, at n 237 for cases); See also Re Adelphia Communications Corp, 544 F (3d) 





duty constitutes a breach,608 requiring the court to remove the breaching party from the 
committee.609 This does not apply to the inherent conflict most stakeholders have with each other 
in the event of an insolvency.610 Also like the monitor, the UCC has to balance conflicting interests, 
as unsecured creditors can and do often hold divergent positions.611 Unlike the monitor and court-
appointed receiver, the UCC is not an officer of the court,612 but the UCC’s representative role, 
vis-à-vis its diverse creditor constituency, attracts the high standards imposed by fiduciary law.613  
The UCC is intended to act as a watchdog for its members,614 investigating the debtor,615 
and providing a counterbalance to the debtor and secured creditors.616 This role often requires it 
to, like the monitor in the CCAA process, provide oversight of the debtor, keeping it in check.617 
To this end, the UCC actively advocates for its members’ best interests,618 unconstrained by the 
impartiality that a monitor is expected to maintain. It can also deal with the debtor in a non-
adversarial way, negotiating as “an ally for the debtor in its negotiations with secured creditors 
and potential postpetition lenders or purchasers.”619 The UCC’s role thus helps to protect the 
interests of unsecured creditors, through the traditional adversarial role of a party to adjudication. 
 
608 Regarding the appearance of bias in the monitor’s role, see especially Nelson, supra note 315 at para 37, citing 
Winalta, supra note 10 at para 82. 
609 Gensburg, supra note 605 at 615, citing Fas Mart, supra note 605, In re Venturelink Holdings, Inc, 299 BR 420 at 
423 (Bankr ND Tex 2003). 
610 Klee & Shaffer, supra note 602 at 1012–13 (“[a]rguably, in many cases every unsecured creditor has a potential 
conflict of interest with the debtor and other persons asserting claims… such a potential conflict cannot be sufficient 
to bar a creditor from membership on an official creditors' committee, or there would be no such committees in many 
cases” ibid). 
611 Harris, supra note 603, citing Re Bohack, supra note 600 at 262. 
612 Wasserman et al, supra note 378 at 177. 
613 Jeffries, “Unsecured”, supra note 376; Fas Mart, supra note 605 at 432; Johns-Manville, supra note 599 at 925. 
614 Harner & Marincic, supra note 603 at 761–62, citing In re AKF Foods, Inc, 36 BR 288 at 289–90 (Bankr EDNY 
1984). 
615 Code, supra note 112, s 1103(c)(2); Harris, supra note 603, citing Re Wilson Foods Corp, 31 BR 272 (Bankr WD 
Okla 1983). 
616 Wasserman et al, supra note 378 at 174. 
617 Harris, supra note 603, citing Re Penn-Dixie Industries, Inc, 9 BR 941 at 944 (Bankr SDNY 1981), Re Advisory 
Committee of Major Funding Corp, 109 F (3d) 219 (USCA 5th Cir 1997). 
618 Wasserman et al, supra note 378 at 172–73, citing Marta G Andrews, “The Chapter 11 Creditors Committee: 
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While it must, like the monitor, balance competing duties,620 the fact that it advocates for and holds 
allegiance to a particular ‘team’ allows the UCC to better define its intended role.621 Nevertheless, 
the UCC model is not without its imperfections. 
The multiple and divergent unsecured creditor interests that are represented by an UCC 
typically work within “a democratic process of discussion, voting, and compromise… [which] is 
significantly susceptible to disagreement and delay.”622 Whether because not all members agree 
on a particular action, or by virtue of changes in membership, the UCC is vulnerable to internal 
dissent and delay.623 Further, given its defined interests, (i.e. to a particular group of creditors), the 
UCC model is vulnerable to self-interested use, which “can skew the court’s and outside parties’ 
perspectives.”624 These negatives can be further compounded by virtue of their cost, vis-à-vis the 
professional fees such committees incur.625 This can be especially harmful to secured creditors 
“because, often, committee professionals are paid out of the cash collateral of a secured 
creditor.”626 Given the trickle down effects of claims, harm to such creditors typically impacts all 
creditors.627 Finally, conflicts of interest can still occur, and “[w]hen a committee breaches its 
fiduciary duties, it creates an opportunity for the financial abuse of the debtor-in-possession and 
negatively impacts the return to creditors.”628  
 
620 Wasserman et al, supra note 378 at 171–72, 176, citing Johns-Manville, supra note 599 at 925. 
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623 Ibid; Harner & Marincic, supra note 603 at 763 (“[t]hese creditors may hold interests, however, that are adverse to 
the debtor or other members of the committee” ibid). 
624 Harner & Marincic, ibid at 766. 
625 Gensburg, supra note 605 at 612–13. 
626 Ibid at 616, citing In re Las Torres Dev, LLC, 413 BR 687 at 699 (Bankr SD Tex 2009). 
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In light of the above synthesis of UCCs, it seems that, in some respects, their defined 
loyalties may afford them a more tenable role as fiduciaries. However, in many ways, they may 
also offer a more focused view of the conflicts of interest faced by insolvency fiduciaries generally.  
(v) Conclusions Regarding Fiduciary Duties  
 The above sections considered the fiduciary duties of different types of professionals, such 
as receivers, directors and officers, the monitor, and finally UCCs. Several conclusions can be 
drawn from this discussion. Court-appointed receivers owe fiduciary obligations to all interested 
parties, and are accordingly expected to remain impartial. Importantly, however, a receiver’s 
impartiality, and thus its fiduciary duties, are not to unreasonably impinge on its ability to carry 
out its responsibilities.629 Directors and officers likewise owe fiduciary duties that are to be 
fulfilled in the best interests of the corporation. While a corporation is comprised of a variety of 
divergent interests, directors are considered to be in compliance with their fiduciary obligations so 
long as they have considered and balanced all relevant factors and acted in good faith.630 Directors 
and officers are impartial, insofar as their fiduciary obligations require them to selflessly work 
towards the objects of the corporation.631 The monitor is supposed to be impartial, but like the 
court-appointed receiver, its impartiality should not prevent it from carrying out its 
responsibilities.632 Likewise, recent cases have raised the question of whether the monitor is prima 
facie a fiduciary, or whether such obligations only apply when the monitor is assigned certain 
responsibilities by the court.633  
 
629 See text accompanying note 629. 
630 Peoples, supra note 573 at paras 43, 46; 1976 Debentureholders, supra note 576 at paras 82–83. 
631 Peoples, ibid at para 35. 
632 See text accompanying notes 568–69. 





Finally, the UCC is composed of fiduciaries, with each member owing a fiduciary duty to 
all other members.634 It owes its allegiance to its constituents, and thus may be considered impartial 
insofar as it is advocating for the interests of its members. Of the four fiduciaries discussed, it is 
the only one that actively advocates on behalf of a defined portion of actors, whereas receivers, 
directors and officers, and monitors each work for the interests of a broader collective. Examining 
these fiduciaries comparatively provides a better understanding of the different ways fiduciary 
obligations are understood in the corporate law and corporate insolvency contexts. With these 
examples in mind, I now turn the focus back on the monitor, and highlight solutions for addressing 
its conflicting roles. 
PART III – IMPROVING THE MONITOR: SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
 Former Ontario Supreme Court Justice James Farley famously proposed the bifurcation of 
the monitor’s role.635 He contended that “insolvency/restructuring culture changes overtime — and 
sometimes very quickly.”636 In his view, the cumulative effect of these changes, particularly 
CCAA amendments, is that “heavier and heavier burdens have been thrown on the role of the court 
appointed officers,” especially the monitor.637 The result is that it is increasingly difficult to “truly 
be objective and neutral” as a monitor in CCAA cases.638 Mr. Farley pointed to the shared history 
between many of the typical players in the CCAA to highlight monitors acting so as to secure 
future work as a potential conflict.639  
 
634 See text accompanying notes 599, 606. 
635 Hon James Farley, QC, “Musings (a.k.a. Ravings) About the Present Culture of Restructurings” (2010) 22 Comm 
Insol R 57 at 59–60. 
636 Ibid at 58. 
637 Ibid at 59. 
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He proposed that the role of the monitor be divided into two: “one role… as an advisor to 
the applicant debtor and to provide appropriate financial and other information[,]… [and] a 
different entity to be the advisor to the court directly and therefore indirectly to all interested 
parties.”640 The latter court advisor role would encompass the traditional watchdog role of the 
monitor, reporting on the debtor and ensuring protection of “smaller or unorganized 
stakeholders.”641 The debtor’s advisor would be appointed in the initial order, as with the current 
framework,642 “with its authority and duties being to continue indefinitely to advise the debtor 
applicant and provide financial and other information but only temporarily in respect of other 
aspects relating to the role of the monitor” as currently understood.643 Mr. Farley’s rationale for 
his proposed changes echoes Topolniski J’s statement in Winalta that the CCAA and its monitor 
act as safeguards for public faith in the insolvency system.644 For Mr. Farley, the need to “keep 
pace with the inevitable evolution” of the insolvency system is necessary to maintain that same 
safeguard.645 Accordingly, he recommended proactive changes in the face of increasing difficulty 
avoiding conflicts of interest in the monitor’s role. 
Recently, Vern DaRe and Alfonso Nocilla re-examined Mr. Farley’s proposal to bifurcate 
the monitor’s role.646 Briefly, they propose amendments to the CCAA aimed at mitigating conflicts 
of interest at the outset: “Parliament should consider amending the CCAA to provide courts with 
the express authority to bifurcate the monitor’s role when a real or apparent conflict arises.”647 
DaRe and Nocilla are concerned with the growing number of duties and responsibilities imposed 
 
640 Farley, ibid at 59. 
641 Ibid at 59–60. 
642 CCAA, supra note 2, s 11.7(1). 
643 Farley, supra note 635 at 60 (Farley notes that the temporary duties continue until ‘Monitor B’ is appointed, at 
which point it will assume the watchdog/reporting role). 
644 Supra note 10 at para 82. 
645 Farley, supra note 635 at 60. 
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on the monitor. Courts increasingly rely on the monitor’s advice and expertise “when exercising 
their discretion to make novel orders that extend the Act’s ambit.”648 The monitor functions as an 
extension of the CCAA court’s supervisory role.649 As restructurings grow in complexity—
especially the growing tendency for CCAA cases to be creditor-driven—the monitor may find 
itself overburdened with responsibilities.650 Moreover, with such growing complexity, courts may 
directly, or indirectly through the monitor, become more active, thus stepping beyond their 
supervisory role.651 While DaRe and Nocilla recognize that “the overwhelming evidence from the 
case law is that monitors are highly ethical and skilled professionals,” their concern is that 
increasing duties create endless potential for conflicts of interest.652 This is important, given that 
courts have stated that even the perception of bias is sufficient to prevent the monitor from carrying 
out its impartial role.653 
DaRe and Nocilla’s bifurcation proposal follows Farley’s vision of a separate debtor-
advisor and court-advisor appointment.654 They add that bifurcation is not a necessary practice in 
all cases, suggesting that judges be provided with “a set of factors… to consider in determining 
whether it would be appropriate to split the monitor’s role, appoint some other officer or even 
empower a creditor’s committee,” depending on the circumstances.655 DaRe and Nocilla provide 
a flexible framework for judges to use when a monitor’s role is stretched thin by the complexity 
 
648 Ibid at 230. 
649 See Callidus, supra note 4 at paras 46–48, 51–52 (court’s supervisory role and monitor as extension thereof) 
[Callidus]; See also Jones, supra note 312. 
650 DaRe & Nocilla, supra note 338 at 241. 
651 Ibid at 249–50, citing Jones, supra note 312 (“[w]hen the court becomes active as an advocate for some particular 
outcome, the function being performed quickly becomes an administrative or executive function, rather than being an 
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of a restructuring, or otherwise encounters a potential conflict of interest.656 This flexibility, which 
reflects a CCAA judge’s discretionary power, opens the door for increased use of alternative means 
of assisting the monitor in discharging its expanded duties.657  
Chapter Two of this thesis discussed one such means of easing pressure off the monitor: 
the Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO), which may be appointed to provide insolvency-specific 
expertise and leadership to the debtor firm.658 Like the monitor, the CRO is a court-appointed 
officer, and is subject to some of the same concerns facing the monitor, such as bias and an 
unsettled fiduciary duty.659 Creditors’ committees are another suggested means of taking pressure 
off the monitor.  These committees function similarly to the UCC in Chapter 11, in that they 
represent their respective creditor constituencies.660 The CCAA does not address committees, 
leaving the formation of such to the judge’s discretion, primarily under section 11.661 Committees 
may be useful in especially complex restructurings, where better organization of creditor groups 
can streamline negotiations and planning.662 They are especially useful in cross-border 
 
656 See e.g., Chartered Professional Accountants Alberta, “2020 CPA Alberta Conduct Case Summaries” (January 
2021) at 15 (individual trustee of the monitor charged with professional misconduct for failing to properly 
communicate with creditors and not cooperating with investigation of a complaint by said creditors). 
657 See e.g., Aquadis, supra note 437 at paras 61, 82 (extending monitor’s role to allow it to sue third parties on behalf 
of the debtor); See e.g., Re 843504, supra note 423 at para 4 (court empowered monitor to run debtor’s operations); 
Mine Jeffrey, supra note 423 at para 39 (monitor empowered to run debtor mining operation); See also DaRe & 
Nocilla, supra note 338 at 237–38 (for a discussion on Aquadis). 
658 Janis Sarra, “Rescue”, supra note 4 at 350. 
659 Ibid at 353–54; Sarra, “Creditor Rights”, supra note 8 at 147. 
660 Robert J Chadwick & Derek R Bulas, “Ad Hoc Creditors' Committees in CCAA Proceedings: The Result of a 
Changing and Expanding Restructuring World”, in J Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2011 (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2012) [Retrieved from WestlawNext Canada]; See e.g., Re Calpine, supra note 309 at para 11; Stelco, supra 
note 113. 
661 CCAA, supra note 2, ss 11 (general power of the court), 11.52(1)(c) (used to secure payment of committee 
expenses); See also Chadwick & Bulas, ibid; Harris, supra note 603; Honourable Madam Justice B E Romaine, 
“Overview of the current status of unsecured creditors’ committees in Canada,” online:<http://www.iiiglobal.org> at 
para 5 (“[t]here are no statutory provisions under the CCAA or the BIA for the appointment of creditors’ committees 
or representative counsel in an insolvency[,]… [h]owever, it has become relatively common in the last ten years for 
the Courts in Canada to use their discretionary power to recognize and accept submissions from ad hoc committees” 
ibid). 
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restructurings, where they provide a venue for better representation of Canadian unsecured creditor 
groups.663 The main argument against committees in Canada is that the existence of the monitor 
renders their role largely unnecessary except in rare cases.664 However, unlike the UCC in Chapter 
11, Canadian ad hoc committees are generally thought to not have fiduciary duties “to similarly 
situated creditors,”665 and because they “are largely self-formed and unsupervised by the Court 
except on a high level, issues of governance can arise that have the potential of impeding, rather 
than aiding, efficient and responsive negotiation.”666 It is no surprise then that committees are not 
a common practice in CCAA cases, with the preferred alternative usually being the appointment 
of representative counsel.667 
A court has jurisdiction to make a representation order upon consideration of a number of 
factors concerning the effect of such an order on the parties.668 In Canwest Publishing, the court 
went so far as to say: “[d]esirably in my view, Canadian courts have not typically appointed an 
Unsecured Creditors Committee… [but] [i]t would be of considerable benefit to both the 
Applicants and the Salaried Employees and Retirees to have Representatives and representative 
counsel.”669 One of the more contentious aspects of representative counsel is funding.670 
Nevertheless, such costs may be a worthwhile trade-off, given their invaluable assistance with 
 
Canadian creditors have begun to look more and more to the use of committees as a way to take advantage of the 
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negotiating and strategizing, along with improving communication channels between counsels’ 
clients and the monitor.671 Information asymmetry is one of the more prevalent difficulties 
encountered in Chapter 11, given the absence of a neutral fiduciary like the monitor. 
One American Fourth Circuit justice proposes a new fiduciary for Chapter 11 that 
resembles the CCAA monitor.672 Justice Harner justifies the need for a “protector” of the 
bankruptcy estate on the basis of the debtor and creditors’ “self-interest and influence by outside 
pressures.”673 Borrowing inspiration from Canada’s insolvency system, among others, Justice 
Harner envisions “a third-party neutral appointed by the court… [a] case facilitator [who] would, 
among other things, work with the DIP to gather information and explore restructuring 
alternatives; provide information to the debtor's stakeholders; act as a facilitator for negotiations 
among the debtor and its stakeholders; and report all relevant information to the bankruptcy court 
and U.S. trustee.”674 Much like the monitor then, Harner’s case facilitator is a watchdog, 
information intermediary, and facilitator of negotiations.675  
Unlike the monitor, the case facilitator “would not independently assess or make 
recommendations to the bankruptcy court regarding the parties’ positions or the debtor's 
reorganization options.”676 The rationale is that being “asked to perform both judgemental and 
facilitative functions” is more likely to result in actual or perceived conflicts.677 The case facilitator 
is limited to helping the parties identify the best plan, by first ensuring they have access to 
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673 Ibid at 474, 476–77, 493 (“[t]he potential vulnerability of DIPs [debtor in possession] and creditors' committees 
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necessary information, and then by reviewing proposed plans.678 The goal is to mitigate the effect 
of parties’ self-serving actions, address the information asymmetry of Chapter 11 cases, and 
ultimately “[facilitate] more meaningful, objective and efficient dialogue among the parties.”679 
The bottom line for Harner’s proposal is to shift restructuring under Chapter 11 towards mediation 
and alternative dispute resolution, and away from overly adversarial litigation.680 These laudable 
objectives are also in line with the CCAA’s various objectives, such that Justice Harner’s case 
facilitator provides some ready lessons for re-envisioning the CCAA monitor. 
PART IV – PROPOSAL 
 The monitor has long been held to owe a fiduciary duty to all stakeholders in the CCAA 
process. At least some of the stakeholders in a typical CCAA proceeding will hold positions at 
odds with others. The monitor will also have pre-existing relationships, with the debtor and often 
many of the creditors as well. There may be especially heavy pressure to pursue a sale or 
liquidation, over a restructuring. The monitor may be working on a restructuring plan, while 
actively soliciting sales. It will ultimately recommend to the court the option which it finds most 
viable. This decision will necessarily benefit some stakeholders to the detriment of others. How 
can such an outcome be reconciled with the monitor’s duty to act in the best interests of each 
stakeholder? 
 Two authors summarize the tension in Canadian insolvency law: “[a] fundamental 
principle in Canada with respect to the appointment of a monitor and/or receiver is the balancing 
of efficiency and cost-saving with the desire and requirement to ensure an insolvency officer is 
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free of conflict, can act independently and is not subject to undue influence.”681 The fiduciary 
aspect of the monitor’s role requires careful attention. It provides the strongest protection against 
conflict of interest by holding the monitor to the highest standard. When coupled with its general 
and specific duties of good faith,682 along with the rules of professional conduct for insolvency 
professionals,683 it is expected that monitors will be careful, neutral, and independent. However, 
“[f]iduciaries can and do act in multiple capacities and they are not necessarily fiduciaries in each 
capacity, or indeed a fiduciary for all purposes.”684 This malleability, referred to by various 
courts,685 leaves a hole in the armour of a court-appointed officer whose role as neutral watchdog 
symbolizes protection of public confidence in the insolvency system.686  
 While committees and representative counsel may ease the pressure on the monitor, 
improving the flow of communication and negotiations, they do nothing to address the monitor’s 
independence. The monitor carries a “duty to ensure that no creditor has an advantage over 
another.”687 Even skillfully organized stakeholders may still be favoured over others, particularly 
if they are able to present a united front. Bifurcation of the role is one feasible solution, because it 
provides a means of neatly divvying up contentious tasks, providing all stakeholders with its 
intended watchdog functions, without detracting from the need to have an advisor for the debtor. 
Yet the bifurcation proposal suggests one role owing duties—and thus loyalties—to the debtor, 
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and another to the court and stakeholders. This does not entirely address the potential for bias, and 
the weak safeguards on independence. 
 I propose the imposition of a new duty on the monitor to the CCAA process itself, which 
duty would consist of the following undertakings: (1) to consider and balance all stakeholder 
interests; and (2) to produce the best possible result in line with the CCAA’s objectives. These 
requirements  echo the court’s statement in Urbancorp,688 to the effect that the monitor’s neutrality 
is not required if it prevents the monitor from pursuing CCAA goals.689 Recall that the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Essar also recognized that the monitor will be at odds with stakeholders because 
of its investigation of the debtor’s finances,690 and will step outside neutrality to take positions 
only when they accord with a restructuring purpose.691 The Supreme Court of Canada has 
summarized the CCAA’s objectives as follows:  
[41] Among these objectives, the CCAA generally prioritizes “avoiding the social and 
economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company” (Century Services, at 
para. 70). As a result, the typical CCAA case has historically involved an attempt to 
facilitate the reorganization and survival of the pre-filing debtor company in an operational 
state — that is, as a going concern. Where such a reorganization was not possible, the 
alternative course of action was seen as a liquidation through either a receivership or under 
the BIA regime. This is precisely the outcome that was sought in Century Services (see 
para. 14).  
[42] That said, the CCAA is fundamentally insolvency legislation, and thus it also “has 
the simultaneous objectives of maximizing creditor recovery, preservation of going-
concern value where possible, preservation of jobs and communities affected by the firm’s 
financial distress . . . and enhancement of the credit system generally” (Sarra, Rescue! The 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, at p. 14; see also Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar 
Global Fund Ltd., 2017 ONCA 1014, 139 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 103). In pursuit of those 
objectives, CCAA proceedings have evolved to permit outcomes that do not result in the 
emergence of the pre-filing debtor company in a restructured state, but rather involve some 
form of liquidation of the debtor’s assets under the auspices of the Act itself (Sarra, “The 
Oscillating Pendulum: Canada’s Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for 
Insolvency Law”, at pp. 19-21).692 
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 There are likely to be many varying interests in any given CCAA case. As observed above, 
the CCAA’s flexibility permits pursuit of a range of options. At one end of the spectrum lies a 
traditional restructuring, while at the other a liquidation of the debtor’s business assets.693 There 
are many potential permutations in between these two different outcomes.694 All stakeholder 
interests, i.e. desired outcomes, can be plotted along this spectrum. A duty owed to the process, 
pursuant to the CCAA objectives, allows the monitor to chart the course of a CCAA case according 
to a position on that spectrum. Once the monitor’s recommended course of action has been 
approved by the court and requisite stakeholders, the monitor can then pursue this chosen course 
in the best interests of all stakeholders. The duty to the process operates as a duty owed to the 
court; it provides an additional layer of protection, and codifies the monitor’s allegiance to the 
CCAA’s objectives. In other words, the best interests of the stakeholders as a collective are the 
baseline for decision-making at two levels: (1) the process of considering and deciding on a plan, 
and (2) the implementation of the plan. The CCAA is fundamentally about making compromises. 
A plan will necessarily benefit some parties more than others. So long as that plan is reached after 
a careful balancing of the various stakeholder interests, adhering to CCAA objectives, the process 
will bear the necessary hallmarks of fairness and transparency. Once a viable plan is fairly selected, 
the “best interests of the collective” will be defined by how best to balance claims with the chosen 
course of action. 
 
693 See Century Services, supra note 3 at para 15; Callidus, supra note 4 at paras 40 (“[u]ltimately, the relative weight 
that the different objectives of the CCAA take on in a particular case may vary based on the factual circumstances, the 
stage of the proceedings, or the proposed solutions that are presented to the court for approval… when a reorganization 
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business operations of the pre-filing company may become the predominant remedial focus” ibid at para 46); Essar, 
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 It remains open to CCAA judges to consider parties’ requests for representation orders, 
and recognition of unofficial committees. Though such decisions are highly context-specific, the 
complexities of a given case may make such orders necessary. These are both ways to also provide 
stakeholders with the ability to present an organized front, which additionally may make the 
monitor’s task easier. This is especially true in cases involving super monitors and cross-border 
proceedings, because: “like other fiduciaries, monitors cannot reasonably take on too many duties 
to different parties whose interests may be, or may become, adverse.”695 Stakeholders in a CCAA 
case typically play an adversarial role,696 each advocating for their own view of a just outcome.697 
Encouraging this adversarial role allows the parties to drive the process, which prevents the court 
or its monitor from stepping beyond supervision and adjudication, into administration.698 The 
court’s role as referee remains “to ensure that it is a fair and reasonable process.”699 This can be 
bolstered by the monitor’s role so long as its focus is on balancing competing interests and 
safeguarding the fairness of  the process.700 This can be achieved by the duty owed to the process. 
 The cornerstone of the CCAA regime is its integrity; the monitor is a natural reflection of 
the need to protect that integrity, acting as guardian of the process.701 Courts and monitors each 
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have duties to uphold public confidence in the regime. The CAIRP Rules of Professional Conduct, 
to which monitors are subject, state as their first principle: “[m]embers conduct themselves at all 
times in a manner that maintains the good reputation of the profession and serves the public 
interest.”702 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Olympia & York Developments Ltd v Royal 
Trust Co703 summarized the court’s role as follows:  
[fairness] is the quintessential expression of the court’s equitable jurisdiction -- although 
the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the 
legislation make its exercise an exercise in equity -- and “reasonableness” is what lends 
objectivity to the process… What is “fair and reasonable”, then, must be assessed in the 
context of the impact of the plan on the creditors and the various classes of creditors, in the 
context of their response to the plan, and with a view to the purpose of the CCAA.704 
The court in Olympia stresses the role of the court as arbiter of fairness in the CCAA process. 
Recall that “the architecture of the CCAA leaves the case-specific assessment and balancing of 
these remedial objectives to the supervising judge.”705 The judge supervises negotiations, often 
through the monitor, while also supervising the monitor itself.706 On the other hand, “[t]he monitor 
is to be independent and impartial, must treat all parties reasonably and fairly, and is to conduct 
itself in a manner consistent with the objectives of the CCAA and its restructuring purpose.”707 It 
is ultimately the court’s role to supervise, and also oversee the balancing of the multiple objectives 
of the CCAA regime and the interests of each particular case.708 The duty to the process, under the 
CCAA’s objectives, allows the court to better instruct and manage the monitor, while also 
clarifying its status as fiduciary. 
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 The Ontario Court of Appeal stated that “a monitor is not necessarily a fiduciary; it only 
becomes one if the court specifically assigns it a responsibility to which fiduciary duties attach.”709 
Under my proposal, the monitor would be a prima facie fiduciary per its duty to the process, best 
understood as a duty to the court. This follows the understanding of the monitor’s fiduciary duty 
prior to Essar, and affords parties with remedies for breach of fiduciary duty at equity. Moreover, 
while not every action undertaken by the monitor carries the obligations of a fiduciary,710 the 
essence of the role vis-à-vis its reporting and advisory functions suggests that the analysis in Essar 
should not be taken to say the monitor is not a fiduciary by default. It would be rare for the monitor 
to not disseminate information, report on the debtor’s finances, or provide an opinion on a 
particular course of action, all of which directly affect stakeholders’ interests.711 This is illustrated 
by explaining how my proposal addresses the issue of the monitor resolving competing demands 
of each stakeholder. In essence, the imposition of the duty to the process, beholden to the CCAA 
objectives, allows the monitor to select an action, (i.e., giving its advice to the debtor or 
recommendation to the court), most in line with a CCAA objective. So long as the monitor 
safeguards the fairness of the process—in pursuit of CCAA objectives—the focus extends beyond 
individual stakeholders.712 If any stakeholder is dissatisfied, it will be up to a court to determine 
whether there has been any unfairness, whether a CCAA objective was pursued, and finally 
whether the stakeholder was fairly and reasonably considered. Applying the mechanics of 
fiduciary obligations to the monitor helps to better understand the proposal. 
 
709 Ibid at para 109. 
710 See Galambos, supra note 532 at para 36, citing Lac Minerals, supra note 518. 
711 Recall the guiding principles of fiduciary doctrine: undertaking to act in the best interests of the stakeholders, who 
are vulnerable to the monitor’s decision-making, because their legal interests can be negatively affected by the 
monitor’s “exercise of its discretion or control”; See Elder Advocates, supra note 513 at para 36. 
712 See Janis Sarra, “Brueghel’s Brush: A Portrait of the CCAA” (2020-2021) 64 CBLJ 72 at 79–80 (Sarra refers to 
Aquadis, supra note 437 at para 73 to say that “[t]he judgment illustrates the close alignment of the monitor’s duties 





 Fiduciary law provides the basic indicia for determining whether a fiduciary duty is owed 
by one party to another. The CCAA court heavily relies upon the monitor,713 such that the 
monitor’s opinions and recommendations almost invariably affect the outcome of a 
restructuring.714 This is the second element of an ad hoc fiduciary duty, i.e., that “the duty must be 
owed to a defined person or class of persons who must be vulnerable to the fiduciary in the sense 
that the fiduciary has a discretionary power over them.”715 It is hard to argue that the weight of the 
monitor’s reports does not connote discretionary power over the stakeholders.716 The first element 
is the “undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of a beneficiary,”717 which is a staple 
of the monitor’s role.718 This is, however, the part of the fiduciary analysis which is unsettled with 
respect to the monitor.719 The Supreme Court of Canada in Galambos stated that: “[r]elevant to 
the enquiry of whether there is such an implied undertaking are considerations such as professional 
norms, industry or other common practices.”720 Accordingly, there is a strong case for an implied 
undertaking, given the high standards imposed on insolvency professionals by CAIRP, the 
monitor’s status as a court-appointed officer, its role as protector of the public faith in the CCAA 
regime, and its similarity to the BIA receiver.721 The Supreme Court of Canada in Hodgkinson also 
stressed that “where a fiduciary duty is claimed in the context of a financial advisory relationship, 
it is at all events a question of fact as to whether the parties' relationship was such as to give rise 
 
713 See e.g., Laurentian, supra note 700 at para 46, citing Nortel Network Corp (Re), 2018 ONSC 6257 (Commercial 
List) at para 27; Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc (Re), 2018 ONSC 6980 (Commercial List). at para 36; Aveos Fleet 
Performance Inc, 2012 QCCS 4074 at para 50(f). 
714 Wasserman et al, supra note 378 at 170. 
715 Elder Advocates, supra note 513 at para 33. 
716 See e.g., Consumers Packaging, supra note 335 at para 2. 
717 Elder Advocates, supra note 513 at para 30, citing Galambos, supra note 532 at paras 66, 71, 77–78; Hodgkinson, 
supra note 518 at 409–10. 
718 See e.g., Laidlaw, supra note 381 at paras 2–3; Siscoe, supra note 336 at para 28; United Auto, supra note 321 at 
para 20; Hickman, supra note 392 at para 33; Sarra, “Ethics”, supra note 323 at 177. 
719 Essar, supra note 306 at para 119; Ivaco, supra note 470 at para 49–53; Re 1231640, supra note 473 at para 51; 
Sarra, “Ethics”, supra note 323 at 180; Wasserman et al, supra note 378 at 170. 
720 Supra, note 532 at para 79. 





to a fiduciary duty on the part of the advisor.”722 The final element is “that the alleged fiduciary's 
power may affect the legal or substantial practical interests of the beneficiary.”723 As with the 
second element, the monitor’s influence over the CCAA process most likely satisfies the need for 
its discretion to affect stakeholders’ interests. 
 A duty to the process clarifies that the monitor is a fiduciary from the moment of its 
appointment.724 This cements the monitor’s role as guardian of public confidence in the CCAA,725 
by subjecting it to the high standards of fiduciary obligations. Importantly, the duty to the process 
also helps to alleviate the tension inherent where a fiduciary owes duties to two conflicting 
parties.726 The monitor’s duty to the process can be understood as “instructions” from the client to 
ensure a fair determination of which outcome to pursue,727 beholden to the high standard of a 
fiduciary to avoid conflict of interest. Like the duty of directors and officers under Canadian 
corporate law, the monitor’s duty to the process is about fairly balancing the interests of the 
stakeholder collective to reach the best outcome under CCAA objectives. Put another way, it could 
be said that the duty is owed to the court and held in the best interests of the CCAA’s objectives, 
in the context of the particular case at hand. 
 
722 Supra note 518. 
723 Elder Advocates, supra note 513 at para 34, citing Frame, supra note 526 at 142. 
724 Note that this is different from the duty to ensure that the restructuring plan is fair and reasonable, because this 
duty is aimed at the process that leads up to the plan and not the substance of the plan itself, though both remain 
equally important issues.  
725 Winalta, supra note 10 at para 73; See also Wasserman et al, supra note 378 at 171. 
726 Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, supra note 513 (“[w]hile it is clear, for instance, that there is no rule of exclusivity 
on the part of some fiduciaries (business agents, for example), any scenario whereby the fiduciary owes a duty to two 
or more “beneficiaries” whose interests conflict will be seen as repugnant” ibid at 1-7).  
727 Ibid (“[u]pon a premise of full disclosure, fiduciary fidelity further manifests itself in a duty to adhere to the specific 






PART V – CONCLUSION 
 The monitor is both a symbol and a champion of the CCAA process. It acts as an extension 
of the court’s supervisory capacity, serves a quasi-mediator function, disseminates key 
information, and is crucial to the approval and implementation of a restructuring plan. Scholars 
and courts have commented on the nature of the monitor’s neutrality since the monitor’s inception.  
This discussion has culminated in questions over whether the monitor is, or can be, truly a 
fiduciary. This Chapter has explored the fundamentals of fiduciary law in Canada, and has 
compared the Canadian and U.S. approaches to this area. This analysis demonstrates the 
complexity of fiduciary law and fiduciary relationships in Canada. In the context of CCAA 
restructuring, it is clear that the monitor cannot possibly satisfy the individual whims of each 
stakeholder. What the monitor can do, however, is seek to resolve the various competing claims 
of different stakeholders through the CCAA process, and in a manner that is fair and reasonable to 
all stakeholders.  
Anchoring the monitor’s role in a duty owed to the CCAA process itself, rather than to any 
particular stakeholder, will help to clarify the monitor’s role as an impartial court-appointed officer 
with multiple, overarching duties. Equity provides an avenue for the pursuit of traditional remedies 
for breach of fiduciary duty. This duty ensures that the monitor is independent but unrestrained by 
independence so that it can assist the court and the stakeholders in fairly formulating a plan in 
accordance with the objectives of the CCAA. My proposal seeks to follow the trend in the CCAA 
of codifying judicial practices,728 and to firmly entrench the duty most vital to the monitor’s 
independence within the legislation. This will promote greater certainty in the legislative scheme, 
thus assisting the monitor in its role as bulwark for public confidence in the Canadian insolvency 
 





system.729 The following Chapter addresses the implementation of the proposed duties, suggests 



















The preceding Chapters laid the groundwork for understanding insolvency law, centering 
on the CCAA,730 and one of the most integral aspects of the CCAA: the monitor. This Chapter 
provides a conclusion to this study of the monitor and its fiduciary duty. Part I begins with a 
synthesis of the preceding three Chapters. Part II provides a breakdown of how the proposal should 
be implemented, including suggested language for codification. Part III addresses weaknesses of 
and anticipated arguments against the proposal. Part IV concludes with summary remarks about 
the impact of this project on the literature. 
PART I – TYING IT ALL TOGETHER 
Chapter One concluded that the CCAA consists of a series of objectives, all of which must 
be balanced and prioritized according to the circumstances of each particular case.731 This has 
encouraged a flexible process in which parties can attempt to sort through the treacherous waters 
of insolvency. This is also why the role of the CCAA court is supervisory in nature.732 In this way, 
the CCAA recognizes that insolvency law is not one size fits all,733 and leaves it to the players and 
the supervising judge to determine the best path to success. Chapter One demonstrated that in 
many ways the balancing of objectives within the CCAA is reflected in attempts by stakeholders 
to lobby in legislatures and especially courts,734 using their particular flavour of insolvency theory 
or CCAA objective to gain more influence or protection in the process. The most prominent of 
 
730 Supra note 2. 
731 Century Services, supra note 3 at paras 40, 46; Essar, supra note 306 at para 103; Callidus, supra note 4 at para 
46; Sarra, “Creditor Rights”, supra note 8 at 54. 
732 Century Services, supra note 3 at paras 47 – 48; Essar, supra note 306 at para 125; Jones, supra note 312. 
733 Schwartz, supra note 150 at 1850 (“[i]n the world of bankruptcy, one size cannot fit all” ibid). 





these groups, historically, has been secured creditors.735 This understanding informs the present 
project in two ways.  
First, because it is courts that have enumerated the multiple objectives of the CCAA,736 
which the legislative text lacks. This finds a ready parallel in the monitor, itself a product of judicial 
ingenuity, subsequently codified after almost a decade of its successful deployment by judges.737 
Second, because the monitor plays a crucial role in the ultimate decisions which resolve a CCAA 
case. This means the monitor’s assessment of a plan, and subsequent opinion and advice as 
provided to the court and the debtor, necessarily accounts for the CCAA’s objectives. The current 
project argues that the monitor should have a duty to safeguard the fairness of the CCAA process, 
beholden to the multiple CCAA objectives. In other words, this project contends that the next step 
in the evolution of the CCAA and its monitor is to put into legislation what judges have been 
saying for decades.738 This is especially relevant because while insolvency legislation is the chosen 
response to the collective action problem, it shifts some responsibility for avoiding that problem 
to the supervising judge and its appointed officer. The concern today is that the monitor is pulled 
in different directions by the different elements of the collective, to the point of actual or perceived 
conflict of interest.  
Chapter Two retraced the monitor’s history, from inception to its current iteration. The 
complexity of restructurings compelled the courts to create an extension of its supervisory 
authority in the monitor.739 Chapter Two outlined how the balancing of the CCAA’s multiple 
 
735 Torrie, ibid at 168. 
736 See e.g., Callidus, supra note 4 at para 46; Sarra, “Creditor Rights”, supra note 8 at 54. 
737 Northland Properties, supra note 320 (first use of the term “monitor”); 1997 Act, supra note 322 (codification of 
the role). 
738 See e.g., Nelson, supra note 315 at para 35; Winalta, supra note 10 at para 67; Re 843504, supra note 423 at para 
19; Siscoe, supra note 336 at 9. 





objectives arises in every aspect of the monitor’s role. It is both the eyes and ears of the court, and 
the symbol of fairness in the CCAA process. To take on the role of impartial officer in the midst 
of numerous, divergent interests is difficult at best. The pressures and stakes of a CCAA 
proceeding weigh on the monitor’s role, as it must consider all options and ultimately give its 
advice and opinion thereon.  
Chapter Two exposed the main concerns in the monitor’s role: its malleable neutrality and 
unclear status as fiduciary. A review of the jurisprudence, reveals a significant gap in the 
understanding of the source of the monitor’s independence and its safeguards. This is especially 
so given that its strongest source of independence, its status as fiduciary, has not been conclusively 
defined or even determined to be a necessary component of the role. Chapter Two is especially 
important to the current project because its examination of the caselaw reveals that, besides three 
statements by the Ontario Court of Appeal,740 CCAA courts across Canada have treated the 
monitor as a fiduciary, owing fiduciary duties to all stakeholders. Likewise, Chapter Two served 
to highlight the many instances in which a monitor may encounter actual or perceived conflicts of 
interest. These included: a pre-existing relationship between the monitor and debtor, the monitor’s 
responsibility to guide the debtor through a restructuring, the practice of pursuing a restructuring 
while simultaneously soliciting sales, persuasion of the monitor by strong stakeholders, its 
malleable neutrality, and its indeterminately defined fiduciary duty. Whereas Chapter Two 
explained the role and the gaps therein, Chapter Three focused on its unclear fiduciary duty as the 
most promising solution to concerns over the role. 
 






Chapter Three presented an overview of Canadian fiduciary doctrine. Then it examined a 
variety of fiduciaries in the corporate and insolvency law contexts, before applying these 
observations to the monitor. Whereas Chapter Two outlined the instances of conflict of interest in 
the monitor’s role, Chapter Three argued these conflicts are precisely why it is important to cement 
the role of the monitor in a way that recognizes its independence. A fiduciary duty is defined by 
the high standards of good faith, loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness.741 Legislative recognition 
that the monitor is a fiduciary and a guarantor of fairness in the CCAA holds the monitor to the 
highest possible standard in every case, communicating through codified language the importance 
of independence for the role. After all, the monitor fulfills a role whose purpose is to protect public 
confidence in the CCAA scheme.742 
Such confidence also comes from greater certainty in the legislative scheme. Chapter Three 
demonstrates the need for certainty with regards to the monitor’s fiduciary duty. The means of 
providing that certainty lies in this dissertation’s proposal for codification. By making the monitor 
a fiduciary by default, tasked with balancing the CCAA’s multiple objectives with the best interests 
of the stakeholder collective, each case can produce an outcome that is in keeping with the spirit 
of the legislation. While the ultimate authority is always the court, Chapter Three clarified that the 
proposed fiduciary duty (set out below) serves to make a court’s job easier. That is, codification 
allows a judge to more easily configure and then supervise the monitor, ensuring fair treatment of 
both individual stakeholders and the collective as a whole.  
 
741 Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, supra note 513 ch 1 at 2, citing CanAero, supra note 521 at 607; See also Ellis, 
Fairbairn & McKendry, ibid ch 1 at 5. 





PART II – IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSAL 
The CCAA has historically evolved incrementally as a result of judicial decisions.743 Its 
inception as a skeletal legislative scheme encouraged judges to exercise their discretion, both 
inherent and that afforded them by section 11 of the CCAA, to develop the law in accordance with 
changes in business and restructuring practice.744 This approach has functioned thus far because 
the flexibility of the legislation and the broad discretionary powers of CCAA judges encourage 
creative solutions even in especially complex cases.745 One of the main areas lacking a clear 
statement on the law is the monitor’s duty or duties, particularly its fiduciary obligations.746 As 
observed in Chapters Two and Three, this position has never been as unclear as it is now.747 
Accordingly, it would fall short of the purpose of a proposal aimed at providing clarity and 
consistency to suggest its implementation through the courts. 
The proposed duty to the process should be codified in the CCAA. In Chapter Three, I 
drew a comparison with the corporate law fiduciary duty of directors and officers, which is found 
in every corporate law statute in Canada. My proposed duty to the process would be similarly 
codified, and would be worded as follows:  
The monitor, in exercising its powers and discharging its duties, shall  
(a) act as a fiduciary, in the interest of safeguarding the fairness of the process by pursuing 
the most reasonable outcome according to the objectives of this Act, in the best interest of 
the stakeholder collective; and 
(b) in the event of a conflict of interest on the part of the monitor, the court will consider 
whether the monitor’s actions were undertaken in pursuit of a valid CCAA objective, 
 
743 Century Services, supra note 3 at para 58; Dylex, supra note 11 at para 10. 
744 Jones, supra note 312; Century Services, supra note 3 at para 48. 
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746 Sarra, “Ethics”, supra note 323 at 180; See also Standing Senate Committee Report, supra note 22 at 5, 184–85 
(“and for trustees, monitors and other insolvency practitioners, who also require comprehensive guidelines about 
their rights and responsibilities” ibid at 5). 






failing which such actions constitute a breach of the duty in (a), giving rise to the traditional 
equitable remedies afforded by fiduciary law to individual stakeholders. 
The codification of this duty accords with one of the fundamental purposes of the monitor: to act 
as a safeguard of public confidence in the Canadian insolvency law system. By being able to point 
to the legislation, the monitor’s fiduciary duty and its independence are thereby grounded as 
essential elements of the CCAA process. Moreover, an unintended but positive effect of this 
codification would be to incorporate by reference the CCAA’s objectives, which currently reside 
in judicial pronouncements and academic texts and not in the legislation.748 
PART III – ADDRESSING WEAKNESSES 
(i) Being Proactive  
 One question that is likely to be raised in light of this proposal is whether changes to the 
monitor’s role are even necessary at this time. After all, there have only been two cases of 
reprimand or removal historically,749 and monitors are typically found to be ethical, effective, and 
professional.750 The simple answer to this question is that it is best to be proactive. Concerns about 
the credibility of monitors endanger public confidence in the insolvency system.751 Much has been 
written about the problems faced by monitors, particularly as concerns their receiver-like role in 
the increasing use of the CCAA to effect sales.752 When coupled with the unclear status of their 
neutrality and fiduciary duty, there arises a need to provide a clear basis on which to base their 
impartiality and role as champion of the CCAA’s objectives.  
 
748 See especially Century Services, supra note 3 at para 40; Callidus, supra note 4 at para 48. 
749 Nelson, supra note 315; Winalta, supra note 10. 
750 DaRe & Nocilla, supra note 338 at 244. 
751 Sarra, “Oscillating”, supra note 250; Winalta, supra note 10 at para 82; Industry Canada, “Fresh Start”, supra 
note 225 at 6 (“[e]quitable treatment of stakeholders and transparent processes also help to protect the integrity of 
the insolvency regime” ibid). 
752 See e.g., Nocilla, “Reorganizations”, supra note 596 at 376; Morin & Mojtahedi, supra note 398; Grant & 





 The current framework combines the requirement in the CCAA that the monitor act in good 
faith in performing its duties,753 with the CAIRP rules of conduct for insolvency professionals.754 
Good faith is imposed on all parties, and does not answer questions of monitor independence. The 
CAIRP rules stipulate that at a minimum, acceptable conduct consists of: acting in a manner that 
serves the public interest, avoiding actual or perceived conflict of interest, and remaining “free of 
any influence… which impairs their professional judgement or objectivity.”755 Although helpful, 
these rules summarize what is already expected of monitors in the caselaw, and do nothing to 
ground or clarify a standard of independence. The proposal necessarily incorporates these 
minimum standards, and provides an indelible statement on monitor independence. 
(ii) Alternative Approaches 
 In Chapter Three, I highlighted some of the suggested means of taking pressure off the 
monitor or changing its role to address inherent and potential conflicts. These included bifurcation 
of the monitor’s role,756 appointment of a CRO,757 appointment of creditor committees,758 
representation orders,759 as well as American commentary on what an insolvency fiduciary should 
look like.760 In light of such well-argued proposals, the current proposal needs to state why it 
provides a more favourable response. The short answer is that a codified duty to the process, in 
the best interests of the stakeholder collective, is the only suggestion thus far that directly addresses 
the status of the monitor as fiduciary. By so doing, this proposal also goes to the heart of the 
monitor’s independence. As observed in Chapter Three, fiduciary obligations carry the highest 
 
753 CCAA, supra note 2, s 25. 
754 CAIRP, supra note 487.  
755 Ibid. 
756 Farley, supra note 635; DaRe & Nocilla, supra note 338 at 226 [emphasis in original]. 
757 See Sarra, “Rescue”, supra note 4 at 350. 
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standards imposed by the law, and require nothing short of utmost good faith and diligence.761 
While bifurcation of the role may ease the workload of the monitor in certain instances, and 
provide better optics vis-à-vis separate advisory responsibilities, either or both of these new roles 
may or may not be a fiduciary under current caselaw. In other words, separating the roles may just 
lead to two separate potentials for conflicts of interest, as opposed to one, while still lacking a 
firmly grounded basis for independence.  
 As for the many other means of providing organization and voice for stakeholders, (i.e., 
committees and representation orders), the same question of independence remains. Better means 
of communication and information sharing do not, on their own, decrease the risk of influence on 
the monitor. If anything, they may increase such a risk, by providing avenues through which 
concerted efforts to influence the monitor can be exercised. 
 These proposals are not to be discarded. They still raise important points, and offer ways 
to address gaps in a very complex process. Bifurcation and the various means of organizing 
creditors are to be considered as supplementary to this proposal. The core of the monitor’s role is 
to be its fiduciary duty as codified. From this starting point, it is open to the courts to adopt such 
strategies depending on the circumstances of each particular case.  
 (iii) Likelihood of Implementation 
 In the law and economics literature, a Pareto Efficiency describes an efficient change as 
one which leaves at least one party better while not causing detriment to any others.762 Another 
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way to state this, and one more pertinent to the CCAA, is that “[u]nfairness resides where only 
some face these risks, [i.e., of uncertainty,] while others actually benefit from the situation.”763 
One important question raised by any proposal for change is whether it is efficient or fair in this 
manner. Chapter One highlighted the historic superior position of strong creditors, particularly 
secured creditors, in the CCAA process.764 Accordingly, another way to ask the above question is 
to ask whether this proposal so disturbs the status quo that it might encounter insurmountable 
obstacles, such as lack of political will or strong lobbying efforts, against its implementation.765  
This proposal is primarily about fairness, and one of its principal guardians in the CCAA: 
the monitor. Better protection and understanding of the monitor’s independence provide greater 
assurance of fairness in the CCAA process.766 This is especially helpful for unsecured creditors, 
because they can point to a duty that requires their interests to be taken into account and balanced 
alongside the CCAA’s objectives. Secured creditors are still going to be the most powerful players. 
This is because of the nature of their credit arrangement, which this proposal does not alter. The 
goal of the proposal is to curb influence on the monitor, by establishing its impartiality, balanced 
with the need to pursue valid CCAA objectives, through codification. Accordingly, weaker parties 
are better protected, and the strongest parties have not had their positions tarnished. In this regard, 
the proposal is both fair and efficient because it does not single any one party or group out. 
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(iv) Judicial Response 
 One of the central supports for this proposal is that it is merely following the flow of CCAA 
evolutionary history: codifying the practices of judges.767 As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, 
there is a long line of cases that consider the monitor a fiduciary.768 Similarly, the duty to the 
process reflects judicial statement that a monitor is first and foremost beholden to the CCAA 
process, its objectives and purposes, and by meeting this qualification it can take a position that 
would otherwise seem biased.769 The proposal conceptualizes this fiduciary duty,  as expressed in 
judgments over time. One might ask how judges have historically responded to similar 
codification. The most recent example of this lies in section 18.6, the CCAA duty of good faith, 
enacted in 2019.770 This provision has not met with resistance by the judiciary,771 despite 
commentary by academics that its usefulness and meaning are unclear.772 It should be noted that 
one of the main issues with section 18.6 is that “good faith” is not defined in the CCAA.773 The 
current project’s proposal does not face a similar issue because its principal goal is to add certainty 
to the regime as a whole by defining the monitor’s fiduciary status. This raises the question of 
whether this certainty is misdirected, given that courts already act as guardians of the fairness of 
the CCAA process. 
In other words, does not a CCAA judge already consider whether a plan is in pursuit of a 
valid CCAA objective? It is important to note that the proposal does not fetter the court’s 
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discretion. The proposal clarifies the monitor’s role by cementing its independence, and adherence 
to fairness and the CCAA’s objectives. As accounting and insolvency experts, monitors’ reports 
are afforded significant respect by CCAA courts.774 The integrity of a monitor’s decision-making 
is protected by the imposition of fiduciary obligations, which is similar to the respect of the 
business judgment of directors and officers by courts in Canadian corporate law.775 As the eyes 
and ears of the court, the monitor is an extension of the court’s supervisory authority.776 All of a 
monitor’s other duties are already codified in section 23,777 except the most important one: its 
fiduciary duty. By codifying its fiduciary obligations, the monitor’s reports to the court and 
guidance to the debtor are qualified by these high standards. This more clearly defines the 
relationship between CCAA courts and monitors, and makes for better understanding of the aims 
of the role.  
PART IV – CONCLUSION 
In these four Chapters, I have analysed the role of the monitor and its broader significance 
to Canadian insolvency law. A review of the cases and commentary since the first use of the term 
“monitor” in CCAA proceedings reveals the success of this creature of judicial creativity. 
Nevertheless, a pragmatic approach to this rapidly evolving area of the law reveals a tendency 
towards complexity and conflicts of interest. In order to provide a response to concerns over 
credibility and transparency in the CCAA process, it is proposed that the legislation proactively 
recognize the monitor as a fiduciary. This proposal firmly entrenches the role of the monitor as 
bulwark of public confidence in the CCAA regime, and additionally provides codified recognition 
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of the role of the CCAA’s multiple objectives within the decision-making process. This change 
does not require a major legislative reform, nor does it change the relative positions of parties to 
the CCAA process. What it does is provide a means for assessing whether a CCAA case has been 
conducted in accordance with the objectives of the legislation, appropriately balanced, and whether 
the monitor’s actions were undertaken in pursuit thereof.  
This introduces some objectivity into the necessary deviations from absolute neutrality that 
monitors will naturally encounter. With multiple, divergent interests at stake, a monitor’s ultimate 
analysis will result in recommendation of a plan that is necessarily undesirable to some parties, in 
relative terms. In order to ensure that the negotiating and decision-making that led to such opinions 
and recommendations is free of bias, stakeholders will be able to point to a duty that requires the 
monitor to fairly balance CCAA objectives in rendering its advice to the court. By proactively 
addressing the perception or actual occurrence of bias in the monitor’s role, this proposal seeks to 
reinforce the essential elements of the Canadian restructuring regime, best articulated by the 
Honorable James Farley: 
We should recall that our restructuring regime is based upon the collective action of a supermajority 
of creditors exercised in a fair and reasonable way in an exercise of corporate democracy — not in 
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